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ABSTRACT
On Sunday, September 11, 2005, Dalton McGuinty announced Ontario’s decision 
to ban faith-based arbitration. This decision came after the government-commissioned 
report by Marion Boyd suggested that faith-based arbitration continue as long as 
safeguards were introduced. In his announcement to the press, McGuinty argued that 
faith-based arbitration was inconsistent with a cohesive multicultural society and that it 
violated the principle of “one law for all Ontarians.” These claims are contestable. 
Neither the theoretical approaches to pluralism nor Canada’s multiculturalism policy 
conclusively shows that faith-based arbitration is inconsistent with multiculturalism or 
that it violates the rule of law. Ontario’s decision ignores that the legal system might 
contribute to demands for faith-based arbitration by the insensitive and inconsistent 
treatment of religious marriage contracts. If Ontario had kept faith-based arbitration and 
introduced the safeguards Boyd proposed, it could have minimized harm to women, 
encouraged participation in the legal institution, and protected individual autonomy.
iii
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Chapter One 
Introduction
Faith-based arbitration is a legal mechanism that allows parties to resolve disputes 
according to religious customs, traditions and rules.1 The Ontario Arbitration Act governs 
all legal arbitrations in the province.2 It allows parties to resolve disputes according to the 
law of their choice, which until February 15, 2006, included the choice to resolve family 
disputes according to religious laws. The decisions arising from these arbitrations were 
binding in the secular court system. After the Act was introduced in 1991, it was used by 
Jewish, Christian and Ismaili Muslim groups to conduct legally binding faith-based 
arbitration.
In October 2003, Syed Mumtaz Ali established the Islamic Institute of Civil 
Justice (IICJ) to erect arbitration tribunals that would resolve disputes according to 
Shari’a law.3 This was opposed by women’s groups who protested that Shari’a law is 
inherently discriminatory towards women on issues of property division and child 
custody. In response to this controversy, the province commissioned former attorney 
general Marion Boyd to investigate and recommend whether the government should 
allow religious arbitration for family law disputes. Boyd’s December 2004 report 
recommended that the province should allow faith-based arbitration as long as safeguards 
to protect women were put in place.4
Despite the report, women’s groups continued to protest that religious arbitration 
would result in a discriminatory legal system. Demonstrations were held in Ontario,
1 John Syrtash, Religion and Culture in Canadian Family Law (Toronto: Butterworths, 1992), 98.
2 The Arbitration Act, S.O. 1991, Chapter 17 [The Act],
3 Annie Bunting, “Mediating Cultures, Arbitrating Family Disputes -  the Proposed ‘Shari’a Tribunals’ in 
Ontario,” draft, November 2004:2.
4 Marion Boyd, Dispute Resolution in Family Law: Protecting Choice. Promoting Inclusion. Report 
prepared for the Attorney General and Minister Responsible for Women’s Issues, December 2004, 133 
[.Protecting Choice].
1
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Quebec, and several Western European countries on September 8, 2005 to convince the
government that it could not enforce arbitration decisions governed by Shari’a law.5 On
Sunday, September 11, 2005, Ontario banned religious arbitration for all faiths. Premier
Dalton McGuinty justified this decision by telling the press,
The notion o f  binding religious (tribunals) is inconsistent w ith one law for all 
O ntarians...W e embrace our diversity, w e support policies that support 
multiculturalism, but at the end o f  the day w e are in this together. W e are 
building on com m on ground and that is the law o f  the land.6
His statement implies that the ability to contract out of family law legislation 
through the Act is inconsistent with the principle of “one law for all Ontarians.” The law 
is portrayed as the “common ground” that unites Ontarians of different cultural and 
religious backgrounds. McGuinty further explained that faith-based arbitration would be 
harmful to Ontario’s cohesive multicultural character by interfering with this legal 
common ground.
The debate over Shariah [s/c] law has caused us to ask a pretty fundamental 
question: Can religious arbitration be part o f  a cohesive multicultural society? It's 
becom e apparent to m e that it cannot.
This thesis questions the reasons McGuinty gave to justify Ontario’s decision to 
ban faith-based arbitration. It suggests that religious arbitration may be implemented in a 
way that does not interfere with Ontario’s legal common ground, and it is not necessarily 
inconsistent with a cohesive multicultural society. Faith-based arbitration could just as 
easily have been accepted on the grounds that it enhances Canada’s multicultural society.
5 Melissa Leong, “Ontario Shariah law plan protested in Europe and Canada,” National Post. 09 Sept. 2005, 
A6.
6 Rob Ferguson, “‘Same Law’ for all Ontarians,” Toronto Star. 14 Sept. 2005, A5.
7 Keith Leslie, “Shariah Decision Upsets Jewish Groups,” Canoe cnews. [online] (12 Sept. 2005, accessed 
15 Nov., 2005); available from http://cnews.canoe.ca/CNEWS/Politics/ 2005/09/11/1212487-cp.html.
2
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The literature review in Chapter Two focuses on the meaning of the term
“multiculturalism.” Both the theoretical approaches and the Canadian policy are
examined to determine whether there is a consistent idea of “multiculturalism” that would
support Ontario’s decision to ban faith-based arbitration.
The Oxford English Dictionary defines “multicultural” as “of or pertaining to a
society consisting of varied cultural groups.”8 “Culture” has been defined as a “shared
group identity”9 and as “a body of beliefs and practices in terms of which a group of
people understand themselves and the world and organize their individual and collective
lives.”10 Culture, then, can be an element of an individual’s personal identity.
Similarly, the federal government’s description of multiculturalism emphasizes
identity, belonging, and acceptance.
Canadian multiculturalism is fundamental to our b elief that all citizens are equal. 
Multiculturalism ensures that all citizens can keep their identities, can take pride in 
their ancestry and have a sense o f  belonging. Acceptance g ives Canadians a 
feeling o f  security and self-confidence, making them more open to, and accepting 
of, diverse cultures. The Canadian experience has shown that multiculturalism  
encourages racial and ethnic harmony and cross-cultural understanding, and 
discourages ghettoization, hatred, discrimination and vio lence.11
While the goals of multiculturalism are relatively clear, there is no consensus 
about how they are best achieved. The two dominant theoretical approaches, “egalitarian 
liberalism” and “the politics of recognition,”12 would achieve Canada’s goals of 
multiculturalism in different ways. While space constraints prohibit an exhaustive review
8 The Oxford English Dictionary. 2nd ed., s.v. “multicultural.”g
Brian Barry, Culture & Equality: An Egalitarian Critique o f Multiculturalism. (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2001), 5.
10 Bhiku Parekh, Rethinking Multiculturalism: Cultural Diversity and Political Theory. (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 2000), 2-3.
11 Department o f  Canadian Heritage, What is Multiculturalism? fonlinel: accessed 09 Aug.
2006; available from http://www.canadianheritage.gc.ca/progs/multi/what-multi_e.cfm.
12 This term is adopted from Charles Taylor’s The Politics o f Recognition. It is used here to refer to those 
theories that are consistent with his argument. Charles Taylor, “The Politics o f  Recognition,” in 
Multiculturalism. ed. Amy Guttman (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994). These theories are also 
commonly referred to as “multicultural theories” in the literature.
3
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of these theories, the review shows that there is no consensus on how a polyethnic society
should be governed or whether liberal democracies should adopt religious arbitration.
Liberal democracies attempt to include all members of society in a belief that the
state functions best when as many citizens as possible participate in its political 
11institutions. It is important for citizens to feel that they can participate in the state’s
institutions in order to feel a sense of belonging to the country.14 This includes
participation in the legal system.
Chief Justice Beverly McLachlin has recognized that the court plays an important
role in Canada’s liberal democracy.
Much of our collective sense of freedom and safety comes from our community’s 
commitment to a few key values: democratic governance, respect for fundamental 
rights and the rule of law, and accommodation of difference. Our commitment to 
these values must be renewed on every occasion, and the institutions that sustain 
them must be cherished. Among those institutions, I believe that Canadian courts, 
including the Supreme Court of Canada, play an important role.15
Despite the stated commitment to accommodating difference, some scholars argue
that demands for faith-based arbitration stem from the court’s inability or unwillingness
to deal with religious difference. Lori Beaman, Pascale Fournier, and Irshad and Qadir
Abdal-Haqq argue that the legal system is not dealing effectively with issues raised by
religious minorities. They argue that minorities might avoid using the legal system
because it is unresponsive to minority religious issues.16
13 John Stuart Mill, Considerations on Representative Government. (Reprint, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1991), 255-256; Sylvia R. Lagos Vargas, “Democracy and Inclusion: Reconceptualizing the Role of 
the Judge in a Pluralist Polity,” Maryland Law Review 58 (1990): 207-09.
14 Vargas, 208.
15 Beverly McLachlin, P.C. The Supreme Court o f  Canada - Welcome, [online]; accessed 10 June 2006; 
available from http://www.scc-csc.gc.ca/Welcome/index_e.asp.
16 Lori Beaman, “The Myth o f Pluralism, Diversity and Vigor: The Constitutional Privilege o f  
Protestantism in the United States and Canada,” Journal for the Scientific Study o f Religion. 42, no. 3 
(2003): 318; Irshad Abdal-Haqq and Qadir Abdal-Haqq, “Community-Based Arbitration as a Vehicle for 
Implementing Islamic Law in the United States,” Journal o f  Islamic Law. 1 (1996): 72; Pascale Fournier,
4
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Although religious arbitration affects members of all faiths who seek to resolve 
civil disputes according to religious rules, this thesis concentrates on Muslim family law 
issues because the public debate has focused on Islam. McGuinty referred to it as the 
“debate over Shari’a law,”17 even though several faiths used religious arbitration. Islam 
has traditionally espoused patriarchal rules that favour men over women. While the 
patriarchal social system is not unique to Islam by any means, women’s groups18 and 
human rights groups19 worried that Islamic leaders would use faith-based arbitration to 
apply discriminatory religious laws.
Several Islamic groups characterized the debate surrounding faith-based 
arbitration as xenophobic and Islamophobic.20 The fact that the Islamic community is a 
growing but still relatively new group to Canada, with practices that are foreign to Judeo- 
Christian traditions, may also help explain why so much emphasis was placed on Shari’a 
arbitration. This thesis does not attempt to explain why the Islamic arbitration caused so 
much controversy. Since this was the most controversial aspect of the debate, the thesis 
focuses on concerns relating to Muslim arbitration and Muslim family issues.
Chapter Three examines judicial decisions arising from disputes over Muslim 
marriage contracts. The results of the analysis show that judicial treatment of religious 
family law contracts has been inconsistent and might discourage minorities from using
“The Erasure o f  Islamic Difference in Canadian and American Family Law Adjudication,” Journal o f  Law 
and Policy. 10, no. 51, 2001-2002.
17 Keith Leslie, “Shariah Decision Upsets Jewish Groups,” Canoe cnews. [online] (12 Sept. 2005, accessed 
15 Nov., 2005); available from http://cnews.canoe.ca/CNEWS/Politics/ 2005/09/11/1212487-cp.html.
18 Women’s Groups whose concerns are referred to in this thesis include the Canadian Council o f Muslim 
Women, the International Campaign Against Shari’a Court in Canada, the National Association o f Women 
and the Law, the Metropolitan Action Committee on Violence Against Women and Children, and the 
Muslim Canadian Congress.
19 Human Rights Groups whose concerns are referred to in this thesis include the Legal Education and 
Action Fund and the International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development.
20 These groups include the Islamic Society o f North America, the Islamic Circle o f  North America, the 
Islamic Social Services Association, the Muslim Association o f Canada and the Federation o f Muslim 
Women. Ferguson, A6.
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the legal system. The demand by religious minorities for legal reform, then, is something 
that the government and judiciary have an interest in pursuing. Chapter Four examines 
whether faith-based arbitration can help create change in a way that is consistent with 
liberal democratic principles.
The second reason McGuinty gave to justify Ontario’s decision to ban faith-based 
arbitration is that it would be inconsistent with Canada’s legal “common ground.” He 
implied that faith-based arbitration would violate the rule of law.
The rule of law is a fundamental principle of liberal democracies. Canada should 
not adopt faith-based arbitration if it violates this rule. Various definitions of the rule of 
law canvassed in Chapter Two lend support to the argument that it does not. Faith-based 
arbitration may not violate the rule of law because it is subordinate to the state system and 
contracted into on a voluntary basis. The extent to which the process is truly “voluntary,” 
however, has been another controversial issue in the debate.
Chapter Four focuses on concerns about the extent to which submission to 
religious arbitration is voluntary. Women’s groups were particularly worried that 
religious communities would pressure women to arbitrate, and socioeconomic concerns 
or fear of repercussions from their families or religious community would coerce them to 
contract out of their secular rights.
Whether the state should enforce religious laws that discriminate on the basis of 
gender was a recurring topic in the debate. Faith-based arbitration highlights the tension 
that exists between autonomy, gender equality and cultural rights. Does accepting that 
culture should be protected because it forms an important part of an individual’s identity 
require allowing the state to give political justification to cultural practices that infringe 
on the rights of women? Does preventing women within minority groups from
6
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contracting out of their equality rights prevent them from acting as fully functioning 
citizens of a liberal democracy? If women are permitted to contract out of secular rights, 
how can the quality of their consent be judged? Should autonomy or gender equality 
prevail in the faith-based arbitration debate? Chapter Four argues that gender equality and 
autonomy can be reconciled by introducing safeguards to the arbitration process that 
educate and protect women while still allowing them to exercise their autonomy.
The reasons McGuinty gave for banning faith-based arbitration are contestable. It 
is not clear that “multiculturalism” demands that faith-based arbitration be banned; in 
fact, it could have been used to argue that it should have been supported. The discourse 
analysis shows that the court can treat minorities insensitively, lending support to the 
argument that there is a need for the government to pursue legal reform. Faith-based 
arbitration might be an appropriate mechanism to make the legal system more responsive 
to religious minorities.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Chapter Two
Evaluating Ontario’s Decision to Ban Faith-Based Arbitration 
Banning Faith-Based Arbitration: A Multicultural Decision?
Premier Dalton McGuinty claimed that religious arbitration cannot be part of a 
cohesive multicultural society. A concrete understanding of the term “multiculturalism” is 
required in order to determine the accuracy of his claim, but unfortunately, it is not easily 
defined. “Multiculturalism” has been used to refer to government policies that give 
recognition to minority groups, to refer to theories of pluralism, and to describe the state 
of affairs where several different ethnic or cultural groups live together in the same 
community.21 McGuinty does not specify in which context he is using the term, and a 
review of both the theories of pluralism and Canada’s multiculturalism policy determines 
that faith-based arbitration is not necessarily inconsistent with a multicultural society.
This paper uses the term “pluralism” to refer to those theories concerned with
00when, and to what extent, a government should institutionalize cultural diversity. The 
term “polyethnic” describes the reality of several cultural or ethnic groups living within 
the same geographic area.23 A polyethnic society is comprised of “national” and “ethnic” 
minorities.24 “National minorities” are groups that have been incorporated into the state 
through “discovery” or conquest. For example, the French-Canadian and Aboriginal
21 Sarah V. Wayland, “Immigration, Multiculturalism and National Identity in Canada,” International 
Journal on Group Rights 5 (1997): 47; Peter S. Li, “The Multiculturalism Debate,” In Race and Ethnic 
Relations in Canada. 2nd ed., ed. Peter S. Li, 148-77, (Don Mills: Oxford University Press, 1999), 149; 
Yasmeen Abu-Laban and Daiva Stasiulis, “Ethnic Pluralism under Siege: Popular and Partisan Opposition 
to Multiculturalism,” Canadian Public Policy XVIII, no. 4 (1992): 367; Will Kymlicka, Multicultural 
Citizenship: A Liberal Theory o f Minority Rights. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), 10; Patrick Loobuyck, 
“Liberal Multiculturalism: A Defence o f  Liberal Multicultural Measures without Minority Rights,” 
Ethnicities 5, no.l (2005): 108; Brian Barry, Culture and Equality: An Egalitarian Critique of 
Multiculturalism. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001), 22.
22 Barry, Culture & Equality. 23.
23 This term is adopted from Kymlicka’s Multicultural Citizenship.
24 Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship. 11.
S
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
people form Canada’s two national minority groups.25 “Ethnic minorities” describes those 
groups that have immigrated to the country. Because this thesis emphasizes Muslim 
demands for faith-based arbitration, the analysis is limited to considering the way the 
policies and theories address the treatment of ethnic minorities.
The History of Faith-Based Arbitration in Ontario
Legally binding faith-based arbitration occurred in Ontario from 1993 until the 
2006 amendments. The Act was premised on the principle that parties should have the 
freedom to arrange their affairs as they see fit.27 Arbitration was a voluntary process 28 
According to the Act, both parties had to consent to participate in the arbitration, and also 
had to agree on who would act as the arbitrator. The arbitrator rendered a final judgment, 
which was binding and enforceable in the secular courts.29 Criminal matters and disputes 
involving third parties could not be arbitrated. Religious arbitration was normally used to 
resolve family law disputes about property division or child custody, but could not be 
used to obtain a divorce.30
Arbitrations were private procedures. The lack of public records has made it
1 1
difficult to determine how frequently religious arbitrations occurred, but there is 
evidence that tribunals were established. Ismaili Muslims set up arbitration tribunals,
25 Ibid., 11-12.
26 Ibid , 11.
27 Natasha Bakht, “Family Arbitration using Sharia Law: Examining Ontario’s Arbitration Act and its 
Impact on Women,” Muslim World Journal o f Human Rights. 1, no.l (2004): 7.
28 Boyd, 13; Bakht, “Family Arbitration using Sharia Law,” 3.
29 Bakht, 3.
30Ibid.- Boyd, 13-14.
31 Bunting, 9.
9
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governed by arbitrators who were trained to understand the culturally-specific context of
Y)the dispute. Community lawyers reviewed the arbitrators’ decisions pro bono.
John Syrtash reported that Catholic and Anglican churches established tribunals to 
deal with religious marriages and annulments, but left matters of support, custody and 
division of property to the secular courts.33 Jewish rabbinical courts were established to 
allow parties to seek a ghet, or religious release of marital obligations. The decisions 
released by Catholic, Anglican and Jewish tribunals that settled issues of marriage and 
divorce were never legally binding because arbitration tribunals do not have the 
jurisdiction to determine civil status.34 Rabbinical courts that made decisions about child 
custody and property division, however, would be affected by the amendments to the Act. 
It is also possible that arbitration occurred more frequently in Christian and Jewish 
communities since Syrtash published his book in 1992, but the lack of public records has 
made this difficult to confirm.
Nothing in the amended Act precludes religious people from seeking advice from 
their leaders, and nothing prevents the resolution of family law disputes according to 
religious laws outside the court system. Ontario’s decision to ban faith-based arbitration 
means these arbitrations no longer have the force of law. McGuinty stressed that this 
decision was necessary. His comments suggested that religious arbitration, and Shari’a 
law in particular, would hinder the goals of multiculturalism. The next section reviews the 
theories of pluralism to see whether they support Ontario’s decision, and to examine the 
theoretical issues that arise in the faith-based arbitration debate.
32 Bakht, “Family Arbitration Using Sharia Law,” 21.
33 Syrtash, 101-102.
34 Ibid.
10
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The Theoretical Considerations Surrounding “Multiculturalism”
Pluralist theories vary in the ways they suggest a polyethnic society should be 
governed. The theories of pluralism can be generally divided into two camps; “egalitarian 
liberalism” and the “politics of recognition.” The following discussion reviews the works 
of these theorists to provide an introduction to egalitarian liberalism and the politics of 
recognition.
The “politics of recognition” is a term coined by Charles Taylor to describe a 
theory of pluralism that focuses on identity and recognition. The work of Iris Marion 
Young, Will Kymlicka and Bhikhu Parekh are generally consistent with the politics of 
recognition. Brian Barry and Patrick Loobuyck write from the egalitarian liberal 
perspective.
The core tenets of egalitarian liberalism include the importance of the rule of law, 
the primacy of the individual, and the notion that special accommodation for minority 
practices is justified only in limited and exceptional circumstances.35 Barry suggests that 
when multiple cultures exist within a single society, the rule of law prevents politicizing 
differences between cultural groups. The law must provide equal treatment for all 
cultures. This raises the question of how “equality” is measured. “Equal treatment” in 
this sense refers to equal opportunity and the equal availability of resources. If resources 
have been distributed unequally in the past, the state should attempt to achieve equality 
by redistributing the resources equitably. For instance, if women did not have access to 
the education needed to successfully climb the corporate ladder, it is appropriate for the 
state to implement affirmative action programs until this imbalance is rectified.
35 Loobuyck, 113; Barry, Culture & Equality. 24.
36 Barry, Culture & Equality. 24.
11
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The politics of recognition defines equality as “equal respect.” Recognizing the 
individuality of every person is essential to recognizing their human dignity. Charles 
Taylor complains that egalitarian liberalism violates the principle of non-discrimination. 
It negates identity by forcing people into a homogenous mold which is supposedly neutral 
but is in fact a reflection of one hegemonic culture.37 The homogenous mold is created by 
subjecting everyone to the same procedures and rules, and the mold that is adopted tends 
to favour majority groups. Young defines equality as “the [equal] participation and 
inclusion of all groups in institutions and positions.” This has led Barry to characterize 
the politics of recognition’s definition of equality as “equality of outcome.”38 Egalitarian 
liberalism and the politics of recognition define “equal treatment” differently. Egalitarian 
liberal theory focuses on equality of opportunity,39 while the politics of recognition 
focuses on giving equal respect to the value of cultural practices.40 The different 
definitions of “equality” help explain the theories’ divergent positions on when the state 
should accommodate minority demands.
Egalitarian liberals argue that since the individual is the most important element in 
society, the most important task of a liberal government is to protect individual rights.41 
Egalitarian liberalism generally rejects state policies that are aimed at protecting a 
culture’s indefinite existence because cultures have no intrinsic value.42 They are valuable 
only insofar as their existence is important to their individual members.43 Although 
Loobuyck argues that the state cannot legitimately use its power to help perpetuate the
37 Taylor, 43.
38 Barry, Culture & Equality. 92.
39 Barry, Culture & Equality. 24; Loobuyck, 113.
40 Taylor, 41.
41 Barry, Culture & Equality. 146; Loobuyck, 113-114.
42 Barry, Culture & Equality. 67-68.
43 Ibid.
12
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existence of different cultures, he does recognize that it is important for individuals to be 
able to access their culture.
Taylor also stresses the importance of culture to the individual. He argues that 
culture is critical to the formation of an individual’s identity.44 The way society 
recognizes one’s cultural group is linked to the individual’s self-perception. Because 
culture is so important to identity, he argues that people must learn about each others’ 
cultures before they judge them as being “good” or “bad.”45 If the group is recognized as 
“bad”, the individual suffers damage.
The majority often rejects cultural practices before they are sufficiently informed 
about the nature and importance of the practice in question.46 He proposes dealing with 
this problem by affording each culture equal respect.47 This requires understanding the 
traditions, values and standards of all the different groups that make up the state so that 
individuals feel included and understood.48 Society would become more tolerant by 
understanding cultural differences.
Barry criticizes this argument, calling it “relativist.” He argues that giving all 
cultures equal respect means deeming them all to be equally “good.”49 According to 
Barry, cultural relativism is dangerous because it prevents the formation of any 
conclusions about the desirability of cultural practices. He asserts that the principles of 
liberal democracies are universal; that the foundational documents of liberal democracies 
suggest that these principles should be followed everywhere, in every culture, because
44 Ibid., 33.
45 Taylor, 70-71.
46 Ibid., 25.
47 Ibid., 66.
48 Ibid , 70-72.
49 Barry, Culture & Equality. 284.
13
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they are right.50 He explains his position with reference to the “Rushdie Affair,” an 
incident where Iran’s Ayatollah Khomeini pronounced a fatwa, or religious sentence, 
against author Salman Rushdie whose book, the Satanic Verses, severely offended some 
Muslims.
The foundational documents of liberalism are the French Declaration of the 
Rights of Man and the Citizen and the American Declaration of Independence.
These make universalistic claims, as does, of course, the United Nations 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Thus, the correct defence of the British 
government’s not punishing Rushdie or handing him over to others for 
punishment...is not ‘This is the way we do things here.’ It is, rather, that this is 
the way things ought to be done everywhere: w e do  things that w ay here not 
because it is p a r t  o f  our culture but because it is the righ t thing to  do .51
Parekh is critical of universalism, describing it as an ambitious, unsubstantiated
philosophical claim. He doubts that principles describing what is “good” can be validly
applied to all cultures.53 Taylor responds to Barry’s criticisms by denying that giving
equal respect to all cultures entails finding them all equally desirable. Rather than
requiring that society blindly accept all cultural practices in every instance, the politics of
recognition suggests that one must learn about a culture in order to evaluate it properly.
According to Taylor, non-Westem cultures cannot be properly judged solely by Western
standards. Society should only conclude that a practice is undesirable once it understands
the reasons why it is accepted within the culture that is seeking to protect it. This ensures
that society is making an informed decision.
The politics of recognition and egalitarian liberalism also differ as to where they
would draw the limits of accommodation. Egalitarian liberals argue that pre-defined
limits are reached when the accommodation becomes either permanent instead of
50 Ibid.
51 Ibid. Emphasis mine.
52 Bhikhu Parekh, “Minority Practices and the Principles o f Toleration,” International Migration Review.
30, no. 1 (1996): 255.
53 Ibid
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temporary or violates the principle of neutrality. Loobuyck defines a temporary 
accommodation as “that which could be repealed if it became redundant,”54 but Avigail 
Eisenberg argues that this definition is problematic. She argues that all accommodative 
measures are ultimately temporary; once a minority changes its practices, accommodation 
is no longer needed.55 “Neutrality” refers to the state giving equal recognition and 
treatment to all cultures, as the state can never be entirely neutral towards all cultures.56 
The law is “equal” because it applies to all cultures in the same way. Barry believes that 
a system of uniform laws is the only appropriate approach to a polyethnic society because 
uniform laws afford equal opportunity to all cultures.57
The politics of recognition is skeptical of this approach. It argues that 
implementing the same law in all situations will result in different impacts on different
C O
cultures. For instance, a commercial Sunday-closing law impacts Saturday Sabbatarians 
more harshly than it impacts Christians. Barry disagrees that failure to offer special 
treatment in such circumstances is itself a kind of unequal treatment. Because he is 
defining “equality” as subjecting everyone to the same rules, inequality of impact is not a 
sign of unfairness.59 He uses the example that laws prohibiting pedophilia or rape have a 
more severe impact on those who are strongly attracted to pedophilia and rape than on 
those who would not engage in such activities, even if they were decriminalized.60 
Although clearly every law is more burdensome to some people than to others, one
54 Ibid., 120.
55 Avigail Eisenberg, “The Limited Resources o f Liberal Multiculturalism: A Response to Patrick 
Loobuyck,” Ethnicities. 5, no.l (2005): 125.
56 Barry, Culture & Equality. 29; Brian Barry, “How Not to Defend Liberal Institutions,” The British 
Journal o f  Political Science 20, (1990): 8.
57 Barry, Culture & Equality. 32.
58 Barry, Culture & Equality. 34.
59 Ibid
60 Ibid.
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cannot compare the prohibition against rape and child molestation with complaints that 
one’s cultural practices are not receiving adequate consideration by the state. While the 
state has an interest in outlawing assault, one of the stated goals of the Canadian 
government is to protect multiculturalism and minority rights. Claims that the state law 
cannot properly respond to cultural practices imposes a different kind of burden than laws 
that criminalize assault.
Barry recognizes that a system of uniform laws always gives rise to those who feel 
that they have been treated unfairly and who will request special accommodative 
measures. The government should deal with these requests by asking what merit there is 
in the complaint.61 If the state agrees that a specific group is unduly burdened by a law, it 
should enact an alternative form of the law that would still meet the objectives of the 
original one while taking the concerns of the minority group into account. This enables 
the state to avoid the undesirable situation of having different rules apply to different 
groups within the same society.62 Although this should be the state’s standard practice, it 
is possible for a situation to arise where accommodation is defensible. For instance, as 
Loobuyck points out, affirmative action is an acceptable policy when it is temporarily 
introduced in order to improve historical disadvantage due to racism or sexism.63 Usually, 
though, either the case for the law is strong enough to rule out the exemption, or the 
argument in favour of the exemption is sufficiently persuasive to suggest that the entire 
law should be repealed or reformed.64 Exceptions to the law should rarely be granted.65
61 Ibid., 32.
62 Barry, Culture & Equality. 38-39.
63 Loobuyck, 117.
64 Barry, Culture & Equality. 39.
65 Ibid., 62.
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There is no consensus within the politics of recognition concerning the limits of 
accommodation. Kymlicka recommends different limits for national and ethnic minority 
groups. Because ethnic minorities normally emigrate voluntarily, they implicitly agree to 
abide by the laws of the new country. Cultural authorities should not be permitted to 
impose on the individual secular rights of their members. Kymlicka opposes religious 
arbitration for Muslims on these grounds.66
Parekh and Taylor would define limits on a case-by-case basis. Parekh supports 
collective rights because they may protect certain rights, like a community’s right to its 
culture or language, more effectively than if the rights were held by individuals alone.67 
Not every cultural practice should be tolerated, however; when cultural practices conflict 
with the practices of the majority, limits should be defined through a “democratic 
dialogue.” The minority party would explain why the practice is important to its culture 
and would respond to governmental concerns about that practice. The government would 
then evaluate whether these responses are persuasive enough to justify accommodating 
the minority practice. This debate is termed “transformative” because it gives an 
opportunity to both the majority and the minority cultures to identify and re-examine 
common values and interests.68 Taylor’s view is similar. He suggests that the majority 
may validly decide that a practice is unacceptable if it is evaluated through standards 
informed by the culture from which it originated.69
The democratic dialogue, or variations thereof, is a prevalent theme in the politics 
of recognition. Young, Taylor and Parekh all argue that minorities should use the
66 Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship. 42.
67 Parekh, Rethinking Multiculturalism. 217.
68 Parekh, “Minority Practices and the Principles o f Toleration,” 261.
69 Taylor, 72.
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democratic process to define the norms and values of the society they inhabit. Young 
proposes a model of “deliberative democracy,” whereby all those who are affected by 
governmental decision-making would have the opportunity to express their different 
positions and challenge the position of others through a democratic dialogue. Each group 
would have the opportunity to attempt to persuade others of the merit of their claims, and 
the opinions of all those who participate could potentially be changed by the process.70 
Parekh suggests that the best way of coming to a decision on whether to allow minority 
practices that may differ from society’s traditional values is through “an open-minded and 
morally serious dialogue with [a] minority spokesman and to act on the resulting
71consensus.”
The democratic dialogue theory is in line with the democratic ideal that all 
members of society should play a role in shaping the polity’s views. There is debate 
among scholars, however, about the extent to which religious discourse should form part 
of this democratic dialogue. Robert Audi argues that including religious citizens in the 
discourse as much as possible helps “secure the vitality of a free democracy.”72 He argues 
that “we should try to cultivate a civic voice that reflects respect for others of differing 
views and a commitment to certain shared...standards that are not dependent on any 
religious commitments or points of view.”73 Steven Shiffrin agrees, stating “it would be 
peculiar to suppose that we want uninhibited, robust, wide-open debate except when 
religious principles are involved.”74
70 Iris Marion Young, Inclusion and Democracy. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 6.
71 Parekh, Rethinking Multiculturalism. 255.
72 Robert Audi, “Religious Values, Political Action, and Civic Discourse,” Indiana Law Review 75 (2000): 
275.
73 Ibid., 294.
74 Steven Shiffrin, “Religion and Democracy,” Notre Dame Law Review 74 (1998-1999): 1645.
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According to Audi, religious discourse is acceptable as long as there are other, 
secular reasons for one’s position on public issues.75 Shiffrin disagrees, arguing that while 
the state should be free from an established church, a plural society should include 
religion and religious individuals, and allow them to weigh in on controversial public
7 f \questions even if religious beliefs motivate their reasons. This is an important 
consideration for religious minorities who propose the use of faith-based arbitration, 
because it would require public officials to recognize and enforce religious laws.
The debate over the extent to which religious dialogue is acceptable in the public 
sphere extends to the courtroom. Chief Justice Beverly McLachlin notes that the court 
provides the forum for public discourse. “Courts offer a venue for the peaceful resolution 
of disputes, and for the reasoned and dispassionate discussion of our most pressing social
77issues.” Rawls suggests that political questions are generally solved with reference to
7  n
public reason, and the court is the “exemplar of public reason.” Unlike the executive or 
legislative branches, the judiciary must justify and explain its reasons according to
70constitutional principles and its interpretation of statute and common law. It is important
to include minority perspectives in this forum.
...the Court’s failure to include and engage minority perspectives in 
constitutional adjudication cases means that minorities are not meaningfully 
included in the dialectic of formulating the substantive values of the polity, 
thereby threatening both the stability and legitimacy of the institution.80
75 Audi, 277.
76 Shiffrin, 1656.
77 Beverly McLachlin, The Supreme Court o f Canada: Welcome, [online]; accessed 10 June 2006, available 
from http://www.scc-csc.gc.ca/Welcome/index_e.asp.
78 John Rawls, Political Liberalism. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 216.
79 Ibid., 216.
80 Ibid., 209.
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Pascale Fournier focuses on the role of the court in her “functional approach.”81 
She argues that the court must be educated as to religious beliefs in order to be sensitive 
to their differences. The court should take a contextual approach to resolving disputes of 
religious minorities by examining the importance of the beliefs to the parties’ on a case- 
by-case basis.82 This approach would help resolve perceptions that the court is insensitive 
to religious minorities, and is discussed more thoroughly in Chapter Three.
Sylvia Vargas argues that the court should treat all citizens as equal participants in 
the democratic dialogue.83 Religious minorities cannot help define Canadian norms and 
values unless they are included in the dialogue. The way that the court defines religious 
minority beliefs impacts their identity as Canadian citizens. Parekh defines “identity” as 
“the chosen or inherited characteristics that define [individuals] as certain kinds of 
persons or groups and form an integral part of their self-understanding.” These 
characteristics result in “identity-related differences.”84 Taylor argues that there is a link 
between recognition and identity; individuals form their own identity through dialogue. 
Identity is crucially dependent on the way that one is perceived by others.85
The concept of religion as identity is problematic. Religion can be both an
oz
individual choice and a culture into which one was bom and raised. A religion’s claim 
to explain the “truth” of the divine implies a choice to believe on the part of its
R7adherents. While some would argue that the decision to belong to a religion is a choice, 
others would argue that religion is part of the culture that an individual is bom into. If
81 Fournier, 68.
82 Ibid., 69.
83 Vargas, 207.
84 Parekh, Rethinking Multiculturalism. 1.
85 Taylor, 34.
86 Richard Moon, “The Imposition o f  Religion,” Prepared for the Religion and Citizenship Conference, held 
at the University o f Windsor, Faculty o f Law, May 5-6, 2006 (Publication Pending), 1.
87 Moon, 2.
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religion can form part of one’s culture, religion can form part of an individual’s identity 
without that person having made the choice to belong to the religion.88 Religious claims, 
then, may or may not be about identity.
To complicate matters further, whether a question of religion is important to one’s 
identity can be subjective. The state must accept the assertions of an individual who 
claims that a religious issue is important to his or her identity, since it is the individual 
who decides what constitutes his or her identity.89 The same religious demand might be 
identity-related for one person and not for another. For instance, it might depend on the 
perceived importance of the religious obligation, or on the depth of the individual’s 
religious devotion.
The state seems to be more willing to accommodate demands related to identity 
than those that stem from association that is a personal choice. This may be because the 
denial of a demand based on an individual’s identity seems to equate to a denial of his or 
her equal worth.90
The concept of religion as identity is complex, and space constraints prevent a full 
consideration of this discussion. For the purposes of the matter at hand, this thesis 
assumes that at least some of the individuals who seek to resolve family disputes 
according to religious laws feel that their religion is a constitutive part of their identity. 
Therefore, this thesis proceeds under the assumption that the state’s acceptance or 
rejection of requests for faith-based arbitration can impact an individual’s feeling of equal 
worth within the state. If religion forms part of one’s identity, requests for
88 Ibid.
89 Avigail Eisenberg, “Identity and Liberal Politics: the Problem o f Minorities within Minorities.” In 
Minorities Within Minorities: Equality. Rights and Diversity, eds. Avigail Eisenberg and Jeff Spinner- 
Halev, 249-270. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 263.
90 Moon, 24.
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accommodative treatment based on religious belief results in “identity-related 
differences.” The religious minority who is seeking faith-based arbitration is seeking 
recognition of religious differences that relate to their personal identity.
Chapter Three looks at whether the legal system acknowledges these identity- 
related differences, and whether they are described or categorized in a way that reinforces 
the supremacy of majority beliefs, or whether minority demands are taken seriously and 
recognized as equally important. The judges determine whether the beliefs or demands 
are recognizable by the legal system, if they are consistent with Canadian values, and if 
they are worthy of accommodation. The way judges arrive at these decisions, the 
reasoning they employ, the language the use, and ultimately the final decision impacts the 
way that the legal system and society at large perceives the religious minorities.
If we accept that religious identity is important for the individual, the way the 
legal system treats religious demands impacts on the way the individual members see 
themselves. This debate must also consider minorities within society’s religious 
minorities. The debate over faith-based arbitration centered around women’s rights. The 
National Association of Women and the Law argue that patriarchal religious beliefs have 
the potential to harm women by favouring men, giving them a greater right to property or 
custody.91 The law, they argue, could not enforce religious laws that violate the right to 
gender equality. One might argue, however, that as long as the woman has a right to exit 
her culture if she does not agree with its rules, the state could enforce these rules.
Both egalitarian liberalism and the politics of recognition argue that individuals 
must have the right to leave his or her culture, or “a right of exit.” Loobuyck argues that 
the right of exit prevents the state from granting cultural rights that may infringe on this
91 Boyd, 32.
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right.92 Some theorists use this to justify the state protection of cultural practices. Under 
this view, the right to exit is an important element for individuals to decide to engage in 
cultural practices because they have the choice to leave that culture if they do not accept 
its rules.93 The opposing view is that gender equality should take precedence over cultural 
rights. The right of exit is not enough to justify the state condoning illiberal practices.94
Those women whose identity is formed, at least in part, by their religion are 
disadvantaged because they are pressured to either reject their religious identity in favour 
of gender equality or be put at the mercy of religious leaders who wish to enforce a 
patriarchal belief system.
The feminist critique is skeptical about giving cultural or religious authorities too 
much control over their members, arguing that such an approach does not adequately 
protect marginalized members within the group. This critique urges scholars to pay 
attention to the power relations inside a group and their struggles over the “authentic” 
interpretation of cultural or religious doctrine, which may be conservative and 
discriminatory towards women.95 They argue that women in illiberal groups may not be 
given a sufficiently strong voice in the democratic dialogue. For instance, one of the 
reasons feminists have opposed faith-based arbitration is that the religious authorities are 
almost always men, and consequently Islamic arbitration tribunals will most likely reflect 
a patriarchal interpretation of Islam.
92 Loobuyck, 114.
93 Jeff Spinner-Halev, “Autonomy, Association and Pluralism,” In Minorities Within Minorities: Equality. 
Rights and Diversity, eds. Avigail Eisenberg and Jeff Spinner-Halev, 157-171. (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2005), 159-61.
94 Eisenberg, “Identity and Liberal Politics,” 253.
95 Ayelet Shachar, “Religion, State and the Problem of Gender: New Modes o f Citizenship and Governance 
in Diverse Societies,” McGill Law Journal. 50 (2005): para. 14.
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Denise Reaume and Ayelet Shachar have attempted to reconcile these problems 
through practical models based on the democratic dialogue theory. Reaume suggests a 
type of cultural self-government where the group is given decision-making abilities on a 
limited range of issues. According to this model, the state would give cultural groups the 
right to govern over some affairs but retain control over others. For instance, the cultural 
group might retain control over defining its membership. The state should not attempt to 
redefine a community by forcing them to include those they would otherwise exclude, or 
vice versa.96 She states that this model is best suited to those groups that hold a world 
view that differs only marginally from that of the majority society.97
Reaume’s model does not specify how society would determine if the minority 
group’s world view differs from the majority in a way that is “significant” but only in a 
“relatively narrow manner” as to qualify for this type of government. Her principles to be 
followed when determining if a culture can be autonomous are vague. The first principle 
is that “cultural autonomy should be respected unless its exercise in a particular case is 
repugnant to justice.”98 How does one determine whether a practice is repugnant to 
justice? She explains, “The repugnancy proviso should be regarded as setting a serious 
threshold -  only if a practice is sufficiently unjust to cross this threshold should the law 
intervene.. .The threshold cannot be defined with any precision.. These principles do 
not give any instruction about how to make such determinations. Furthermore, they are 
susceptible to being interpreted in accordance with the unconscious racism or 
unexamined assumptions of the majority. It makes little sense to ask society to determine
96 Denise G. Reaume, “Legal Multiculturalism from the Bottom Up,” in Canadian Political Philosophy, eds. 
Ronald Beiner and Wayne Norman (Don Mills: Oxford University Press, 2000), 198-99.
97 Ibid., 202.
98 Ibid.
99 Ibid., 204-205.
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whether a practice is “repugnant to justice” if the problem lies in the majority unfairly 
judging minority practices.
Shachar advocates the “joint-govemance model” to achieve cooperation between 
the state and the cultural group. She is critical of giving exclusive jurisdiction to either the 
state or the group because members of minority groups have a national as well as a 
cultural identity. Neither the state nor the culture can adequately protect both identities, so 
a system of cooperation is necessary.100 The joint-govemance model would divide 
jurisdiction over some legal issues between state and cultural authorities. Sharing 
jurisdiction would give minorities within groups the ability to appeal to whichever 
authority would best protect them.101 She uses the Islamic arbitration tribunals as an 
example of the joint-govemance model, stating that the tribunals would be acceptable 
provided they be altered to include more protection for minorities, such as a requirement 
to receive independent legal advice.102 In terms of religious arbitration, she suggests a 
mandatory review of all arbitration settlements, where the judge would ensure that the 
decision was made with consent and in accordance with the beliefs of the parties.103 This 
system would create an incentive for religious groups to implement their religious values 
in a way that the court would not later over-turn.104
This model recognizes that there is merit in allowing cultural and religious 
minorities to control certain affairs relating to their identity, but instead of dividing 
jurisdiction so that either the group or the state makes the final decision, sharing
100 Ayelet Shachar, “Should Church and State be Joined at the Altar? Women’s Rights and the Multicultural 
Dilemma,” in Citizenship in Diverse Societies, eds. Will Kymlicka and Wayne Norman, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2000), 218.
101 Shachar, “Religion, State and the Problem o f Gender,” at para. 39.
102 Ibid., at para. 47.
103 Ibid., at paras. 49-50.
104 Ibid., at para. 51.
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jurisdiction avoids giving either group exclusive control over the outcome.105 This model 
addresses the fact that a change in civil family status can affect one’s membership status 
within a group, so it makes sense for the person being affected by these decisions to be 
able to defer to a cultural or religious authority on these issues as well.106
Shachar’s model depends on cooperation between the state and the cultural or 
religious authorities to be effective. Problems might arise in determining which 
circumstances, if any, the state would refuse to share jurisdiction with a group. When 
could the state withhold this devolution of power? Would cultural groups be at the mercy 
of the state to decide to share jurisdiction? What if the religious or cultural authorities 
refused to accept the joint authority of the state?
France’s governing doctrine of laicite is an example of the egalitarian liberal 
theory put into practice. Laicite is comprised of the principles of freedom of religion, 
equal respect and state neutrality.107 It dictates that the state should be entirely secular, 
and state institutions should not promote any religion. France used this doctrine to ban 
any portrayal of religious affiliation in public schools, which includes banning Muslim 
women from wearing the hijab because it is a sign of religious allegiance.108 This rule has 
been the cause of significant controversy, with several Muslims reporting that they feel 
unfairly ostracized from French society by the rule.109 This illustrates a weakness with 
egalitarian liberal theory. It can promote facial equality by subjecting all members of 
society to the same rules, regardless of outcome, which can make minorities feel
105 Shachar, “Should Church and State be Joined at the Altar?,” 218.
106 Shachar, “Religion, State and the Problem o f Gender,” at para. 73.
107 C^cile Laborde, “Secular Philosophy and Muslim Headscarves in Schools,” The Journal of Political 
Philosophy. 13, no.3 (2005): 306.
108 Ibid
109.— “French Muslims fear ‘state within a state,’” BBC News, 02 Dec. 2004 [online newspaper]; accessed 
15 Nov. 2005; http://news.bbc.co.Uk/2/hi/europe/3482641.stm.
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ostracized. The politics of recognition, then, may be seen as more favourable to minority 
cultures.
This admittedly brief review of the theories of pluralism indicates that there is no 
one dominant, consistent theory of multiculturalism. This division of theorists into two 
competing schools is not meant to ignore the variation that exists within each, but the 
overview is sufficient for the purpose of this research. Either banning or accepting faith- 
based arbitration could be justified by “multiculturalism,” depending on which theory the 
government subscribes to. Although there is no theoretical consensus about what 
“multiculturalism” requires in this situation, Ontario’s reliance on “multiculturalism” as a 
decision to ban faith-based arbitration may be justifiable if Canada’s multiculturalism 
policy tells the government how it should respond to demands for faith-based arbitration. 
The next section examines whether Canadian institutions have offered a clearer definition 
of what “multiculturalism” means in Canada.
Multiculturalism in Canada
Pierre Trudeau introduced Canada’s multiculturalism policy in 1971. Kymlicka 
argues he did so without any well-developed underlying theory or long-term strategy for 
implementation.110 Some have accused the Liberal party of passing the policy just to 
attract minority votes.111 Neil Bissoondath criticizes the Multiculturalism Act112 as being
110 Will Kymlicka, Finding our Wav: Rethinking Ethnocultural Relations in Canada. (Toronto: Oxford 
University Press, 1998), 40; Li, 149.
111 Li,152; Wayland, 47.
112 Multiculturalism Act, R.S. 1985, c. 24 (4th Supp.).
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devoid of principles; it does not communicate any long-term plan for the country, nor 
does it identify what Canada is aspiring to achieve through the legislation.113
Kymlicka is less critical. He describes the multiculturalism policy as one which is 
aimed at reducing the pressure on immigrants to assimilate.114 The pressure to assimilate 
might be greater for some groups than others, and might differ depending on the prevalent 
attitudes towards immigration. Kymlicka’s description suggests that the multiculturalism 
policy is sufficiently flexible to reflect the changing pressure on minority groups. Patricia 
Roy agrees that the policy is flexible, and offers evidence of its evolution over time as 
proof. The policy’s initial focus was the promotion of cultural expression, and has since 
evolved to focus on eliminating racial discrimination.115
While Bissoondath argues that the policy does not define what a successful 
multicultural society is,116 T. John Samuel and Dieter Schachhuber suggest that the goal 
of multiculturalism in Canada is “to ensure full participation and full contribution by all
117Canadians.” Samuel and Schachhuber’s definition accords with the federal 
government’s definition of multiculturalism as allowing citizens to keep their cultural 
identities and feel a sense being Canadian at the same time.118
The literature demonstrates that there is more agreement about what 
multiculturalism in Canada should achieve than about how it should be achieved. The
113 Neil Bissoondath, “A Question of Belonging: Multiculturalism and Citizenship,” in Belonging: The 
Meaning and Future o f  Canadian Citizenship, ed. William Kaplan, (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen’s 
University Press, 1993), 372.
114 Kymlicka, Finding our Wav. 40.
115 Patricia E. Roy, “The Fifth Force: Multiculturalism and the English Canadian Identity,” The Annals of 
the American Academy. 538, no.l (1995): 201.
116 Bissoondath, 372.
117 T. John Samuel and Dieter Schachhuber, “Perspectives on Canadian Diversity,” in 21st Century 
Canadian Diversity, ed. Stephen E. Nancoo, (Mississauga, Educator’s Press, 2000), 32.
118 Department o f Canadian Heritage, “What is Multiculturalism?” [online]; accessed 09 Aug. 2006; 
available from http://www.canadianheritage.gc.ca/progs/multi/what-multi_e.cftn.
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policy itself does not set out clear guidelines about how Canada should achieve its goals 
and its substance is unclear. The literature highlights the nebulous character of the 
multiculturalism policy.
Kymlicka’s work refers to specific policies that are often labeled as “multicultural 
policies,” but his discussion is not limited to policies that have actually been enacted in 
Canada. He prefers to focus on how both real and proposed policies might help 
immigrants integrate into Canadian society.119 Romulo Magsino attempts to formally 
identify Canada’s policy. He asserts that it demonstrates a consistent commitment to 
“equality,” and reasons that equality is an underlying principle of pluralism in Canada. He 
defines it as “having access to what one justly deserves as a human being.”120 He does 
not, however, specify how “equality” is measured, and so how “equality” influences 
Canadian policy remains unclear. Does “equality” refer to equality before the law, 
equality of opportunity, or some other measure? Neither Magsino nor Kymlicka 
elaborates on whether Canada adheres to egalitarian liberalism or the politics of 
recognition.
Peter Li examines the policy in an attempt to explain the confusion surrounding
10 1 •  •  •the concept of “multiculturalism.” He begins by outlining the Multiculturalism Act's
ten objectives:
(1) to acknowledge the freedom o f  cultural choice for all Canadians; (2) to 
recognize and promote multiculturalism as a fundamental characteristic o f  
Canada; (3) to promote full and equitable participation o f  individuals and 
com m unities o f  all origins; (4) to enhance the developm ent o f  com m unities 
sharing a  com m on orig in ; (5) to  ensure equal treatment and protection for all 
individuals w hile respecting their diversity; (6 ) to encourage and assist social 
institutions to be respectful and inclusive o f  Canada’s multicultural character; (7)
119 Kymlicka, Finding our Wav. 42.
120 Romulo F. Magsino, “The Canadian Multiculturalism Policy: A Pluralist Ideal Re-Visited,” in 21st 
Century Canadian Diversity, ed. Stephen E. Nancoo, (Mississauga: Canadian Educators’ Press, 2000), 328.
121 Li, 148.
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to promote the understanding from intergroup interactions; (8) to foster the 
recognition and appreciation of diverse Canadian cultures; (9) to preserve and 
enhance non-official languages while strengthening the official languages of 
Canada; and (10) to advance multiculturalism in harmony with the commitment 
to official languages.122
He then quickly touches on the establishment of the Department of 
Multiculturalism and Citizenship in 1990, the budget of the Department in 1991 and 
1992, and its eventual relegation to a branch under the department of Canadian Heritage 
in 1994.123 He does not, however, conduct a thorough examination of the contents of the 
policy. The ten objectives are vague, and as such they cannot provide clear guidance to 
the government when it is faced with a difficult situation like faith-based arbitration. Both 
the opponents and proponents of faith-based arbitration could argue that their opponents 
are being inconsistent with these objectives. For example, opponents of faith-based 
arbitration could argue that the objective “to ensure equal treatment and protection for all 
individuals while respecting their diversity” would require that the government protect 
the minorities within the religious groups who could be exploited in the faith-based 
arbitration process. Proponents could argue that the objectives of promoting “full and 
equitable participation of individuals and communities of all origins,” or “to encourage 
and assist social institutions to be respectful and inclusive of Canada’s multicultural 
character” require the establishment of religious arbitration tribunals in order to fully 
include minorities in the legal institution.
It is possible that a thorough review of the substance of Canada’s multiculturalism 
p o lic y  h as not b een  con d u cted  b eca u se  it p erm eates through several policy areas. In 
addition, although the government has produced a plethora of documentation referring to
122 Ibid., 155-56.
123 Ibid., 157-58.
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“multiculturalism,” there is no single document that outlines the substance of the policy. 
If this is the case, it may not be accurate to define Canada’s multiculturalism policy in 
concrete terms.
Where Canada’s multiculturalism policy draws the limits of accommodation is 
unclear. Bissoondath suggests that the policy leaves no room for limits; the philosophy of 
the policy names everything cultural as sacred, and because it is sacred, society must 
accommodate itself to every display of cultural life.124 He gives three examples of 
practices whose accommodation might be demanded in the name of multiculturalism; 
religious arbitration, female genital mutilation and the Hindu practice of Settee, where a 
widow commits suicide by burning herself alive on her husband’s funeral pyre. 
Although his use of these examples is theoretical, to lump them together as if they can 
appropriately be compared against one another is misleading. It is inappropriate to 
compare Muslim demands for religious arbitration with practices that result in irreversible 
physical mutilation or death, and highlights the need to examine how faith-based 
arbitration would work in practice before jumping to dramatic conclusions about its 
effects on women. Like Bissoondath, Kymlicka groups the requests for religious 
arbitration and requests to perform clitoriodectomies together as examples of the types of 
demands that are made in the name of multiculturalism.126 The degree of harm caused by 
genital mutilation and the degree of harm caused by allowing parties to come to a 
consensus about property division based on religious beliefs is quite different, and 
lumping them both together may give readers the false impression that the degree of harm 
caused by both practices is comparable.
124 Bissoondath, 380.
n5Ibid.
126 Ibid.
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Kymlicka disagrees that the logic of Canada’s policy dictates that all minority 
practices have to be tolerated.127 He would reject Muslim requests for faith-based 
arbitration because it would hinder the group’s integration into Canadian society by 
decreasing their participation in mainstream social institutions. He also notes its potential 
to infringe on human rights.128 Kymlicka believes that giving groups the option to 
conduct religious arbitration would affect political participation or integration into 
mainstream society. This assumption is examined throughout this thesis. Contrary to his 
assumption, if religious minorities feel that they are not being treated fairly in the secular 
court system, they may defer to cultural authorities and reject the legal system entirely. 
Integration and political participation could be affected if minorities feel that the legal 
system is not “neutral” and cannot recognize their claims.
The multiculturalism policy and its objectives are national, while faith-based 
arbitration and the establishment of a judicial system is under provincial jurisdiction. 
Ontario does not currently have a well-developed multiculturalism policy or 
multiculturalism legislation. “Multiculturalism” in the province is currently subsumed 
under the Ministry of Immigration and Citizenship, and it is not the primary focus of the 
ministry. The absence of a defined provincial policy, and McGuinty’s comment that 
Ontario “supports policies that support multiculturalism,” supports the inference that 
Ontario would follow the federal multiculturalism framework. This literature review 
illustrates that there is no agreement about the content, direction, goal or requirements of 
the federal multiculturalism policy. The government’s commitment to multiculturalism, 
then, does not necessarily dictate that faith-based arbitration be rejected.
127 Kymlicka, Finding our Wav. 65.
128 Ibid., 43.
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If faith-based arbitration violates the rule of law, however, Ontario’s decision 
might be justified. Canada is committed to the rule of law. A legal mechanism that 
violates this rule would be unacceptable.
The Rule of Law and Faith-Based Arbitration
Ontario’s decision to ban faith-based arbitration was based, in part, on the view 
that the law should apply equally to everyone. McGuinty stated, “the notion of binding 
religious (tribunals) is inconsistent with one law for all Ontarians.”129 One might argue, 
however, that faith-based arbitration does not violate the rule of law.
Dicey defined the rule of law as having two components: “equality before the 
law,” which means that state officials are not above the law, and the supremacy of 
“regular law,” or state law, over “arbitrary power.” The rule of law means laws must be 
fairly enacted, enforced, made available to the public and apply equally to state 
officials.130 Other scholars have defined the rule of law more broadly. T.R.S. Allen 
suggests that laws that fail to respect the equality and human dignity of individuals are 
contrary to the rule of law.131 Peter Hogg and Cara Zwibel define the rule of law as 
having three elements; “(1) a body of laws that are publicly available, generally obeyed, 
and generally enforced; (2) the subjection of government to those laws 
(constitutionalism); and (3) an independent judiciary and legal profession to resolve 
disputes about those laws.”132 According to these definitions, allowing parties to contract 
out of secular law in family disputes does not necessarily violate the rule of law. None of
129 Ferguson, A5.
130 Peter W. Hogg and Cara F. Zwibel, “The Rule o f Law in the Supreme Court o f  Canada,” University of 
Toronto Law Journal 55. no. 3 (2005): 715-16.
131 Ibid., 716.
132 Ibid., 718.
33
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
these definitions specify that the rule of law requires every person to be subject to 
identical laws in every instance.
These definitions suggest that the government could uphold the rule of law while 
recognizing legal pluralism. A social scientific view of legal pluralism is not inconsistent 
with the rule of law. John Griffiths distinguishes between “juristic legal pluralism” and 
the “social scientific view of legal pluralism.” Juristic legal pluralism occurs when the 
state’s legal system applies different bodies of law to different ethnic or religious groups 
within the state. This would appear to violate the rule of law.
The social scientific view of legal pluralism focuses on the reality that different
i  i - j
laws exist within society, and the state laws are simply one of many types of laws. The 
two differ to the extent that the state institutionalizes legal pluralism. Any debate about 
faith-based arbitration, then, should consider the extent to which it institutionalizes a 
social scientific view of legal pluralism, or whether it violates the rule of law by holding 
individuals to different laws based on ethnic or religious affiliation. This subject is 
discussed in more detail in Chapter Four.
Just as the theories of pluralism and multiculturalism policies do not necessarily 
dictate that the government must reject faith-based arbitration, it is not clear that faith- 
based arbitration violates the rule of law.
Treatment of Minorities within the Legal System
One might argue that multiculturalism requires examining why demands for faith- 
based arbitration exist in the first place. Accommodative measures are warranted if the 
legal system is somehow unjust towards religious minorities. Considering why demands
133 Sally Engle Merry, “Legal Pluralism,” Law & Society Review. 22, no. 5 (1988): 871.
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for religious arbitration exist in the first place would help determine whether the legal 
system is somehow intrinsically unfair to minority religious groups.
Examining the role of state institutions in creating minority demands is consistent 
with the “historical institutional” approach. While egalitarian liberalism and the politics 
of recognition focus primarily on how to respond to minority demands, historical 
institutionalism focuses on why these demands exist in the first place. The historical 
institutional approach studies how a state’s institutions contribute to minority groups’ 
identities and their demands for accommodation.
Historical institutionalism treats the political institutions as a variable that affects 
political outcomes.134 It assumes that policies develop from a variety of unexpected
1 35actors and events rather than from a logical sequence of strategic decisions. Historical 
institutionalism defines “institutions” as “the rules of electoral competition, the structure 
of party systems, the relations among various branches of government, and the structure 
and organization of economic actors like trade-unions.”136 It studies how political 
institutions influence the interests and preferences of its citizens.
Historical institutionalism can be contrasted with the cultural approach, which 
attempts to interpret the meaning of cultural identities and to suggest strategies to deal 
with their claims rather than to explain how the claims are created and made politically 
relevant.137 The cultural approach views minority requests for accommodation as an 
attempt to protect cultural differences. It takes as a matter of fact that cultural differences 
exist, and that demands made by cultural groups stem from particular cultural traits.
134 Ibid., 511.
135 Ibid., 512; Ellen M. Immergut, “The Theoretical Core o f the New Institutionalism,” Politics & Society. 
26, no.l (1998): 19.
136 Ibid
137 Andr6 Lecours, “Theorizing Cultural Identities: Historical Institutionalism as a Challenge to the 
Cultralists,” Canadian Journal o f Political Science. XXXIII, no. 3 (2000): 500.
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Historical institutionalism, on the other hand, focuses not only on whether 
institutional rules disadvantage immigrant groups and help create claims for 
accommodation, but also looks at how institutional symbols and rules affect a culture’s 
self-perception. The institutions themselves may have a hand in creating the identity of 
the group. Historical institutionalism is a useful approach to studying the demands for 
faith-based arbitration because it focuses on which groups hold power in society and
11flattempts to identify biases inherent in political institutions.
Some scholars have identified the principles embedded in historical
institutionalism without directly engaging this approach. Shachar invokes the principles
of historical institutionalism when she argues that fears of assimilation can drive cultural
1 ^ 0leaders to impose strict behavioural rules on women. The way the state responds to 
cultural differences can exacerbate or lessen them.
The literature in this area supports the historical institutional approach by 
suggesting that one reason religious minorities demand faith-based arbitration is that they 
feel excluded from Canada’s legal institutions. Bunting notes that Muslims support 
alternative dispute resolution because they are afraid that their religious beliefs would not 
be respected or upheld in the secular court.140 Minority religious groups may also fear that 
society is prejudiced towards their way of life. They may feel that the larger society feels 
that their religious convictions are “a sign of intellectual or psychological weakness and 
brainwashing.”141
m Ibid., 513-14.
139 Shachar, “Should Church and State be Joined at the Altar?,” 202.
140 Bunting, 6.
141 Lois Sweet, “Accommodating Religious Difference: The Canadian Experience,” In Possibilities and 
Limitations: Multicultural Policies and Programs in Canada, ed. C. E. James, 130-153. (Black Point: 
Femwood Publishing, 2005), 139.
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The court system may be inadequate for dealing with Islamic issues for “reasons
ranging from hostility and ignorance to jurisprudential and constitutional restraints.”142
This may be, in part, because Islamic values are still relatively new and “foreign” to
Canadian law. Christianity is easily the dominant religion in Canada, with over 80% of
Canadians identifying with the Christian religion in 1993.143 Lori Beaman points out that
a consequence of the Roman Catholic and Protestant religious hegemony is that the
interpretation of what is “normal” in terms of religious belief is made in comparison to
Protestant and Catholic norms.144
Beaman’s study looks at four categories of religious minority groups that seek to
protect their practices under the freedom of religion. She cites the Supreme Court case
Bhinder v. C.jV. 145 as an example of how the court treats groups in the “immigrant
religion” category. In this case, a Sikh man requested an exemption from wearing a hard
hat at work because he felt he had a religious obligation to wear his turban at all times.
His claim was ultimately rejected. Beaman notes,
In cases like Bhinder, the courts displace the individual from the group and are thus 
able to ignore the widespread impact o f  discriminatory legislation. The individual is 
constructed as an ‘exception’ w ho is seeking special dispensation for exem ption from  
what is inevitably characterized as a ‘sensible’ rule.146
When compared to Western values, the turban becomes nothing more than a hat,
and the requirement that it be removed for work is seen as a reasonable request. Beaman’s
argument would be strengthened by going beyond this single case and examining a larger
sample of cases, as well as more recent cases, involving claims by religious minorities.
142 Abdal-Haqq, 72.
143 Roger O’Toole, “Religion in Canada: Its Development and Contemporary Situation,” Social Compass.
43, no.l (1996): 122.
144 Beaman, 318.
145 Bhinder v. C.N., [1985] 2 S.C.R. 561.
146 Beaman, 320.
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Examining the construction of religious minority requests in family law cases is 
particularly useful, because faith-based arbitration generally deals with family law 
disputes. Now that faith-based arbitration is not legally recognized, parties must resolve 
their issues according to secular legislation in order for the decision to be legally binding. 
It is worth looking at how court decisions treat religious minorities and their claims. The 
historical institutional approach lends support to the argument that these decisions might 
contribute to demands for faith-based arbitration.
The way the court handles minority claims contributes to whether they feel 
included in Canadian society. John Rawls argues that a stable democracy includes each of 
the polity’s members. Inclusion helps create stability by allowing minority groups to 
believe that “the polity’s fundamental terms can fulfill their aspirations and acknowledge 
their sense of self.”147
Polyethnic societies contain several, often competing, world views and moral 
perspectives. Being sensitive to these differing perspectives increases the legitimacy of 
the legal system. “The Court’s legitimacy in a democratic polity depends on its ability to 
claim that it is neutral, and that it attempts in good faith to interpret principles of justice 
for the well-being of all social groups.” Tom Tyler suggests that minorities are more 
likely to accept the authority of the legal system if they perceive it as being able to take 
their different perspectives into account, even if the judicial outcome is not in their 
favour.148 If the legal system is not seen as being procedurally fair when competing moral 
issues arise, the legal system loses legitimacy.
147 Vargas, 208.
148 Tom R. Tyler, “Multiculturalism and the Willingness o f  Citizens to Defer to Law and to Legal 
Authorities,” Law & Social Inquiry. 25, no. 4 (Autumn 2000): 1014.
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Tyler suggests that it is important that the courts communicate respect in order for 
those minorities to feel included in society, to accept the legitimacy of the legal system 
and to feel a sense of belonging. Since the court acts as an agent of the state, its decisions 
are seen as emanating from the state. The court would ideally promote multiculturalism, 
then, by engaging in an inclusive dialogue that considers society’s divergent opinions. If 
the court does not adequately consider minority views, it would hinder multiculturalism’s 
goal of inclusion.
Conclusion
Ontario justified its decision to ban faith-based arbitration on the grounds that 
there is no place for religious arbitration in a cohesive multicultural society. McGuinty 
did not specify how he was using the term or how Ontario’s decision was protecting 
“multiculturalism.” The literature review demonstrates that there are differing views 
about how a polyethnic state should treat minority differences. A review of the theories of 
pluralism and Canada’s multiculturalism policy suggests that the government could have 
either preserved or banned faith-based arbitration in the name of “multiculturalism.” If 
Ontario is truly concerned about whether religious arbitration is consistent with 
multiculturalism, it should study whether religious minorities have been treated unfairly 
within the judicial system. If the demands arise from discrimination in the legal system, 
rather than from a cultural authority’s desire to protect culture for culture’s sake, or 
control its members, both theories of pluralism and the multiculturalism policy might 
support introducing some kind of alternative measures.
Chapter Three studies the treatment of religious minorities in the legal system 
through a judicial discourse analysis of family law decisions involving Muslim marriage
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contracts. It takes the historical institutional approach by focusing on how the state can 
help create demands for faith-based arbitration, rather than assuming that the demands 
naturally arise from specific cultural traits. The way that the court treats religious 
minorities in family law cases can help determine whether demands for faith-based 
arbitration may be attributed, in part, to the legal system’s failure to adequately address 
religious concerns.
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Chapter Three 
Judicial Discourse and Muslim Family Law Contracts
Scholars have suggested that demands for faith-based arbitration arise, in part, 
from a perception that the court system cannot adequately respond to the demands of 
religious minorities. Religious minorities may request a mechanism like faith-based 
arbitration because it can be presided over by religious authorities who will understand 
the context and importance of their religious request, unlike the secular court.149 Demands 
for faith-based arbitration may stem, at least in part, from the court’s treatment of 
religious minorities.
The legal system’s treatment of religious minorities is examined because couples 
will most likely use marriage contracts to enforce religious obligations now that faith- 
based arbitration decisions are no longer legally binding. It is worth looking at how the 
court has dealt with these contracts in the past. Does the court engage in inclusive 
dialogue, demonstrating sensitivity to the religious request, or has it dealt with requests in 
ways that could create concerns about resorting to the legal system? This chapter reviews 
case law dealing with Muslim marriage contracts and the court has treated religious 
clauses in family law contracts inconsistently. This inconsistency has led to an uncertain 
state of law. The review also demonstrates that the language and reasoning used by the 
court can be insensitive to religious differences.
149 Lori Beaman, “The Myth o f  Pluralism, Diversity and Vigor: The Constitutional Privilege o f  
Protestantism in the United States and Canada,” Journal for the Scientific Study o f Religion. 42, no. 3 
(2003): 318; Irshad Abdal-Haqq and Qadir Abdal-Haqq, “Community-Based Arbitration as a Vehicle for 
Implementing Islamic Law in die United States,” Journal o f Islamic Law. 1 (1996): 72; Pascale Fournier, 
“The Erasure o f  Islamic Difference in Canadian and American Family Law Adjudication,” Journal o f Law 
and Policy. 10, no. 51, 2001-2002.
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“Sensitivity” in Judicial Discourse
The Oxford English Dictionary defines “insensitive” as “not aware of or able to 
respond to something.”150 This chapter shows that the court is not ‘insensitive’ in that it 
display no concern for the interests of minorities, but rather that the court can be unaware 
of or less able to respond to issues facing religious minorities.
Insensitivity is used to describe cognizance of differences. “Insensitive” is not an 
ideal term because it implies a degree of subjectivity, but similar problems arise with 
more objective terms like “fairness” or “equality” as well. As the introduction points out, 
“equality” can be defined in different ways. What different groups regard to be “fair” 
might differ depending on what they expect from the state. Using “sensitivity” as a 
concept through which the court’s treatment of religious minorities is examined is 
consistent with the way the term “sensitivity” is used by Avigail Eisenberg in “Identity 
and Liberal Politics.”151
To help avoid the subjectivity that arises from the concept of “insensitivity,” this 
paper will use this term to refer to how the court considers the religious context of the 
minority request. It can help identify why Muslims may be concerned that the judicial 
system is unable to adequately address Islamic issues.152
The Intersection of Religion and Contract Law
The Canadian Constitution does not have an anti-establishment clause that clearly 
separates church and state. The freedom of conscience and religion at section 2(a) of the 
Charter means that Canada cannot compel its citizens to observe a particular religion, or
150 The Compact Oxford English Dictionary, s.v. “insensitive.” Online edition, accessed April 5, 2006; 
available from http://www.askoxford.com.
151 Eisenberg, “Identity and Liberal Politics,” 250.
132 Abdal-Haqq, 72.
42
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
to engage in religious practices. Canada has a kind of “cooperationist” relationship with
churches, which is described as one where “a separation of church and state is claimed yet
1 > «a posture of benevolent neutrality toward religion is maintained.” While there is no 
clear doctrine of separation of church and state in Canada, some separation is implied.154 
This is in line with the liberal democratic principle that there should be some separation 
between church and state, and of religious and secular reasoning in political decisions.155
Religion and family matters generally form part of the private sphere, but the 
public and private spheres intersect when couples make a contract dealing with issues of 
civil status like marriage or divorce. The court cannot avoid matters of religion in family 
law disputes. Religious couples have asked that the court enforce marriage contracts 
based on religious obligations.
The remainder of this chapter demonstrates that judges have had difficulty 
determining whether religious beliefs can be recognized in a way that is consistent with 
the principles of contract interpretation. They have been inconsistent in their approach. In 
some cases the court has been willing to look beyond the religious intentions of parties to 
the terms of the contract to see whether it can be upheld at law. In other cases, the court 
refused to uphold a contract because its terms referred to religious obligations. There has 
been inconsistency between provinces and inconsistency in the court’s reasoning between 
cases. Consistency in the law is important because it helps individuals to know whether 
their contract will be enforced.
153 Natasha Bakht, “Arbitration, Religion and Family Law: Private Justice on the Backs o f Women.” Report 
prepared for the National Association o f Women and the Law, March 2005 [online]; accessed 24 May 
2005; available from http://www.nawl.ca/ns/en/publications.html, 53.
154 Ibid
155 Audi, 275-6.
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Since the court cannot avoid dealing with religious issues or requests, they should 
deal with these matters consistently. The court must decide whether it can uphold 
contracts that refer to religious obligations or whether they must be struck down as void 
for public policy reasons, however, contracts that do not require the court to make 
pronouncements on the substantive content of religious obligations or practices but were 
made to be consistent with a religious belief may not be against public policy.
Laws are not “neutral” with respect to religion. Pascale Fournier warns against 
applying “neutral” legal principles to minorities, because the laws are not neutral but 
reinforce majoritarian concepts.156 The laws arise from the Christian tradition and are 
embedded with Christian ideals, even if they do not explicitly contain specific Christian 
principles. The lack of Christian marriage contracts dealing with these issues suggests 
that the laws generally accord with Christian beliefs in matters of custody and property 
division. “Neutral” family laws have had a disproportionate effect on religious 
minorities.
Even though Canadian laws have become more secular, they derive from 
Christianity. Christian beliefs have historically been pervasive in Canadian family law. 
The common-law definition of marriage was accepted until 2003, when the Ontario Court 
of Appeal ruled that it was unconstitutional because it did not include same-sex 
marriages.157 The accepted definition was Lord Penzance’s religiously-based statement in 
Hyde v. Hyde and Woodmansee15*. He said, “I conceive that marriage, as understood in 
Christendom, may for this purpose be defined as the voluntary union for life of one man
156 Fournier, 64.
157 Halpern v. Canada (Attorney General) 172 OAC 276 (Ont. C.A.) (Halpern).
158 Hyde v. Hyde and Woodmansee (1866), L.R. 1 P. & D. 130.
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and one woman, to the exclusion of all others.”159 The statement also precludes the legal 
recognition of polygamy. The Christian understanding of marriage and its condemnation 
of extra-marital sex has inspired laws that deny recognition to children bom outside of 
marriage. Limiting divorce to instances where adultery, cruelty or abandonment could be 
proven reflected the Christian prohibition on divorce.
Most of these laws changed as the majority became increasingly secular. Children 
bom outside of marriage are no longer legally “illegitimate,” and the law has adopted a 
“no-fault” approach to divorce. The Christian definition of marriage has changed, 
although polygamous unions are still not recognized and bigamy remains a criminal 
offence. These changes do not prove, however, that family laws are now “neutral.” The 
parties to cases dealing with religious marriage contracts are overwhelmingly members of 
minority religions.
This review did not uncover any cases where Protestants or Catholics attempted to 
contract out of the statutory family law regime. Cases dealing with Catholic or Protestant 
religious issues in family law contracts were limited to setting out whether the children 
would go to a religious school or whether they would be raised in a particular faith. This 
is perhaps because Catholic and Protestant religious doctrine is not inconsistent with the 
secular laws, and so members of these religions have no reason to enter into religiously- 
based marriage contracts dealing with property and religion. The other possibility is that 
mainstream Christian churches have adapted to secular society and do not espouse rules 
that are severely at odds with mainstream secular values. Either way, the majority’s 
religious beliefs about property and custody are not at odds with the secular law to the 
extent that they would want to vary it through contract. The lack of mainstream Christian
159 Halpern at para. 1.
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religious contracts suggests that family laws in Canada affects religious minorities 
disproportionately as compared to the religious majority.
Egalitarian liberals might argue that although the laws are not “neutral” as to 
religion, they are “neutral” in the sense that they are applied even-handedly. But if the 
laws discourage religious minorities from appealing to the court or effectively exclude 
them from participating in their capacity as religious individuals, one might question how 
well the court is accommodating difference. Even-handed application of laws that 
disproportionately affect religious minorities can result in laws that are applied equally 
but which have disproportionately severe impacts on some groups.160
Egalitarian liberalism and the politics of recognition might support exploring legal 
alternatives due to the disproportionate affect secular family laws have on religious 
minorities. The politics of recognition would be concerned with judicial discourse that 
suggests that the court is either not willing or unable to take Muslim differences into 
account.
This case law review demonstrates that Muslims may be dissuaded from using 
Canada’s legal institution to resolve family law disputes. The values of Canadian family 
law and contract law conflict with some religious practices and beliefs to the extent that 
Muslims may avoid appealing to the court. Furthermore, the uncertain state of the law 
with respect to religious family contracts and lack of alternatives like faith-based 
arbitration means that religious minorities may not be able to resolve family law matters 
with reference to religious beliefs in a legally enforceable manner. If multiculturalism is
160 Chief Justice Beverly McLachlin has stated that the court is committed to accommodating difference.
See Beverly McLachlin, The Supreme Court o f Canada: Welcome, [online]; accessed 10 June 2006, 
available from http://www.scc-csc.gc.ca/Welcome/index_e.asp.
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meant to ensure “full participation and full contribution by all Canadians,”161 the state 
should consider legal alternatives to encourage religious minorities to participate without 
having to give up their religious identities. One of these alternatives is Pascale Fournier’s 
functional approach, which is discussed in this chapter. Another alternative is faith-based 
arbitration, which is considered in more depth in Chapter Four.
Judicial Treatment of Mahr Agreements
Two legal principles come into conflict when the court is called upon to uphold 
contracts with religious aspects. On the one hand, promoting individual autonomy is at 
the root of contract law. On the other, the court adheres to the principle that it generally 
should refrain from interfering in matters of religion.
Contract law presumes that individuals know what is in their own best interest and 
allows them the freedom to pursue it. Contract law renders the state neutral as to the 
individual’s objectives.162 It emphasizes individual liberty, autonomy, and self-reliance. 
Individuals are encouraged to pursue their own self-interest by ordering their lives in a 
way that will cause them the most happiness, or allowing them to contract to do that 
which they believe is just or right. This is consistent with the liberal view that the state 
should not interfere with the actions of individuals unless they cause harm to others.163 
Contract law generally allows people to agree to anything that is not otherwise illegal or 
void on public policy grounds. It protects vulnerable people from contracts that would 
otherwise be enforceable by vitiating them if its terms are vague or unconscionable, or if 
there is evidence that fraud, duress, or coercion was exerted on one of the parties.
161 Samuel, 32.
162 Hugh Collins, The Law o f Contract. 3rd ed. (London: Butterworths, 1997), 6.
163 John Stuart Mill, On Liberty. (Reprint, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), 16-17.
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When religious contracts are put before it, the court must balance the principle of
individual liberty with the principle that the state should not interfere with matters of
religion. The court abhors making pronouncements on religious doctrine. Justice
Iacobucci iterated this principle in Syndicat Northerest v. Amselem.
In my view, the State is in no position to be, nor should it become, the arbiter of 
religious dogma. Accordingly, courts should avoid judicially interpreting and thus 
determining, either explicitly or implicitly, the content of a subjective understanding 
of religious requirement, "obligation", precept, "commandment", custom or ritual. 
Secular judicial determinations of theological or religious disputes, or of contentious 
matters of religious doctrine, unjustifiably entangle the court in the affairs of 
religion.164
Just as the court refuses to become entangled with religious laws, it also refuses to 
allow religious laws to interfere with civil laws. In Baxter v. Baxter165, a Catholic man 
argued that the court was violating his freedom of conscience and religion by granting his 
wife a divorce. He argued that they had a religious duty to remain married.166 Justice 
Pennell stated,
Marriage, like divorce, is of concern not merely to the immediate parties. It affects 
personal rights of the deepest significance. It also touches basic interests of society.
Public policy has fixed the status of the marriage transaction as a civil contract. The 
parties may choose to enter into a marriage contract in the manner directed by their 
religious scruples or the canons of their church, but as a civil contract, the legal effect 
may not be altered by private agreement of the parties or their religious tenets. Out of 
marriage spring social relations and duties with which government is necessarily 
required to deal.167
But this principle may not extend so far that it precludes the court from enforcing 
otherwise legal contracts simply because its terms are based on religious beliefs. The 
cases dealing with Islamic marriage contracts, or mahr agreements,168 have forced the 
court to determine whether they can adjudicate contracts where the terms are based on
164 Syndicat Norther est v. Amselem, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 551 at para. 50 [Amselem],
165 Baxter v. Baxter, 1983 CarswellOnt 324 (Ont S.C.).
166Ibid., at paras. 3-4.
167 Ibid., at para. 12.
168 The case law and scholarship indicate that there is more than one accepted spelling variation o f “mahr”, 
but this spelling is adopted for the purposes o f this thesis.
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specific religious beliefs. The mahr agreement is a marriage contract whereby the 
husband agrees to pay the wife a specified amount upon the dissolution of their marriage. 
It is designed to provide the wife with financial security.169 Sometimes the husband pays 
a small portion of the mahr at the time of marriage and defers the remaining, larger 
portion to be paid if the marriage dissolves. The mahr is described in the case law as one 
of three elements necessary for an Islamic marriage, which include competence to marry,
17f)declaring the intention to marry before witnesses, and agreeing to a mahr. Canadian 
trial-level courts have disagreed as to whether the mahr is justiciable.
The Ontario Court of Justice refused to uphold a mahr agreement in the 1998 case, 
Kaddoura v. Hammoud. The husband and wife signed a mahr agreement prior to the 
wedding. The husband paid five thousand dollars at the time of the ceremony and 
deferred thirty thousand dollars to be paid if the marriage dissolved.171 Less than two 
years later, he served his wife with a petition for divorce.172 At trial she argued that the 
mahr was enforceable under section 52(1) of the Ontario Family Law Act, which allows 
for any two married people to enter into a contract regarding ownership in or division of
17Tproperty. The husband argued that the mahr was a religious contract and therefore not 
justiciable at law.174 There was no conflict between the parties about what the mahr 
required them to do. The husband’s argument was quite straightforward. While he
169 Kaddoura v. Hammoud{ 1998), 168 D.L.R. (4th) 503 (Ont. Ct. J.) at para. 13 [Kaddoura],
170 Ibid., at para. 12.
171 Ibid., at para. 15.
172 Ibid., para. 4.
173 Section 52(1) o f  the Family Law Act states:
“Two persons who are married to each other or intend to marry may enter into an agreement in which they 
agree on their respective rights and obligations under the marriage or on separation, on the annulment or 
dissolution o f the marriage or on death, including, (a) ownership in or division of property; (b) support 
obligations; (c) the right to direct the education and moral training of their children, but not the right to 
custody o f or access to their children; and (d) any other matter in the settlement o f  their affairs.”
R.S.O. 1990, c. F.3, s. 52 (1); 2005, c. 5, s. 27 (25) [FLA],
174 Kaddoura at para. 23.
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understood the terms of the mahr, he did not think that the civil court would ever compel
him to pay the deferred portion.175
The court accepted the husband’s argument. Justice Rutherford found that the mahr
was “fundamentally an Islamic matter,” and as such, any consequences of breaking the
agreement must be solely religious as well. He believed that enforcing this agreement
would force the court to overstep its role and rule on religious dogma. He stated,
In my view, to determine what the rights and obligations of Sam and Manira are in 
relation to the undertaking of Mahr in their Islamic marriage ceremony would 
necessarily lead the Court into the "religious thicket," a place that the courts cannot 
safely and should not go.177
This result contradicts a line of British Columbia cases upholding the mahr. The
178first British Columbia case to consider the mahr was Nathoo v. Nathoo. The parties to
this case underwent an Islamic marriage ceremony which included entering into a mahr
agreement. The document they signed stated,
I hereby agree and undertake to pay an agreed sum of money by way of “Maher” to 
my said wife. I hereby agree and confirm and declare that my understanding to pay 
the agreed sum of money by way of Maher to my wife shall be in addition, and 
without prejudice to and not in substitution of all my obligations provided for by the 
laws of the land.179
The court found that this constituted a marriage agreement pursuant to section 48 of
the 1979 Family Relations Act.xm Having accepted that the contract was justiciable, the
judge proceeded to consider the husband’s argument that it should be varied because its
181terms were unfair. The court rejected this argument and enforced the mahr.
175 Ibid., at para. 16.
176 Ibid, at para. 25.
177 Ibid., at para. 28.
178 Nathoo v. Nathoo, 1996 CarswellBC 2769 (B.C.S.C.) [Nathoo],
179 Ibid., at para. 8. This wording is the same in all the mahr agreements considered in Nathoo, Amlani and 
M. (N.M.).
180 Ibid., at para. 23.
181 Ibid., at paras. 26-27.
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Amlani v. Hirani182 was decided four years later. The husband applied to the court 
for a declaration that the mahr was not a marriage agreement pursuant to section 61(2) of 
the 1996 Family Relations Act.183 The court upheld the mahr by finding it constituted a 
marriage agreement for ownership in “other” property.184 This court found that each 
element that the Family Relations Act requires in a valid marriage contract was present in 
this case.
The facts in M. (N.M.) v. M. (N.S.)185 were similar. The husband signed a mahr 
agreement where he agreed to pay $51,250 if he and his wife separated.186 Like in 
Kaddoura, the husband argued that he believed that the mahr was only a ceremonial 
agreement that would not be upheld in a secular court. While he did not read the
1 87document, he admitted that he understood its terms. The court differed from Kaddoura 
by upholding the mahr,188 even though the facts of both cases were essentially identical 
and the family law legislation was very similar.
The Ontario Court of Justice decided the latest case considering an Islamic marriage 
in 2005. Khan v. Khan189 dealt with a nikah agreement. The case describes a nikah as a 
standard Pakistani marriage contract.190 The parties were married in a religious ceremony
182 Amlani v. Hirani, 2000 CarswellBC 2663, 2000 BCSC 1653 [Amlani].
183 Ibid. at para. 10. Section 61(2) o f  the 1996 Family Relations Act states:
A marriage agreement is an agreement entered into by a man and a woman before or during their marriage 
to each other to take effect on the date o f  their marriage or on the execution o f the agreement, whichever is 
later, for (a) management o f  family assets or other property during marriage, or (b) ownership in, or 
division of, family assets or other property during marriage, or on the making o f an order for dissolution of 
marriage, judicial separation or a declaration o f nullity o f marriage.
R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 126.
184 Amlani at paras. 16-17 and 32.
185 M. (N.M.) v. M. (N.S.), 2004 CarswellBC 688, 2004 BCSC 346 [M. (N.M.)].
186 Ibid., at para. 7.
187 Ibid., at para. 26.
188 Ibid., at paras. 29-30 and 32.
189 Khan v. Khan, 2005 CarswellOnt 1913, 2005 ONCJ 115 (Ont. Ct. J.) [Khan].
190 Ibid., at para. 22.
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in Pakistan.191 This was an arranged marriage, “according to their culture’s tradition.”192 
The husband was in Canada at the time of the marriage and signed the marriage contract 
by proxy.193 He then sponsored his wife’s immigration to Canada, but they separated 
approximately one year later.194 The nikah contained a provision whereby the wife 
renounced her right to spousal support.195 The husband argued that the nikah was a valid 
marriage agreement that must be recognized internationally.196 The wife relied on 
Kaddoura for the proposition that the contract was religious in nature and therefore not 
justiciable by the civil court.197
The court decided to “enter into the religious thicket” and consider whether the
10Scontract was justiciable. The agreement was deemed to be a valid marriage contract, 
but was set aside pursuant to section 56(4) of the FLA199 on the grounds that enforcing it 
would result in unconscionable circumstances. The court found as a matter of fact that the 
wife had no part in negotiating its terms and had no choice but to sign it in order to be 
married. She did not have total financial disclosure from her husband and there was 
inequality of bargaining power as she had not received independent legal advice.200 These
191 Ibid., at para. 2.
192 Ibid., at para. 9.
193 Ibid., at paras. 10-11.
194 Ibid., at paras. 13 and 17.
195 Ibid., at para. 22.
196 Ibid , at para. 29.
197 Ibid., at para. 25.
198 Ibid., at para. 32.
199 Section 56(4) o f the FLA states, (4) Setting aside domestic contract. — A court may, on application, set 
aside a domestic contract or a provision in it, (a) if  a party failed to disclose to the other significant assets, 
or significant debts or other liabilities, existing when the domestic contract was made; (b) if a party did not 
understand the nature or consequences of the domestic contract; or (c) otherwise in accordance with the law 
of contract. Family Law Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. F.3.
200 Khan at paras. 49-50.
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factors led the court to declare that the wife did not understand the nature or
*)01consequences of the contract.
The British Columbia and Ontario trial courts have been inconsistent with each 
other in their treatment of the mahr. The British Columbia trial court has upheld the 
mahr, while the Ontario court has struck it down. Although the decision in Kaddoura 
does not set out the precise wording of the contract, it appears that the mahr in this case 
contained similar terms to the agreement described in Nathoo. The Ontario and British 
Columbia family law statutes are also similar, so it is reasonable to expect that Kaddoura 
and the British Columbia cases would have had the same outcomes.
The Ontario court was inconsistent between Kahn and Kaddoura as well. In 
Kaddoura, the court refused to even consider the contract because it referred to a 
religious obligation. In Khan the court noted that the contract was religious in nature but 
decided to consider it anyways. This contract was deemed to be justiciable at civil law. 
While the court likely came to the correct outcome in Khan, it is interesting that in this 
case the court would consider a religious contract but in Kaddoura it would not. The 
divergent approaches taken in Kaddoura, Khan and the British Columbia cases indicates 
that guidance is needed from an appeal level court to clarify how religious marriage 
agreements should be handled.202 The court should be clear about when it will “enter the 
religious thicket.” Greater consistency would help minorities determine whether a 
contract is worth pursuing in the secular court and would also help clarify when the court 
can decide issues relating to religion.
201 Ibid., at para. 53.
202 Bakht, “Family Arbitration Using Sharia Law,” 12.
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It is clear that the court abhors making pronouncements about the content of a
religious obligation. If the content of the religious obligation is not at issue, are
contractual terms reflecting a religious belief enough to render that contract
unenforceable? If so, religious minorities are forced to translate religious obligations into
secular terms in order to form binding contracts. In Kaddoura, Justice Rutherford
suggested that the contract may have been enforceable if it were not for its religious
intention. Justice Rutherford refused to award the husband costs.
[It was] somewhat offensive and dishonourable on the part of Mr. Kaddoura, to 
knowingly participate in the wedding customs and practices of his Muslim 
community, including the mahr which he clearly knew included a "written" or 
deferred amount of $30,000, and then eschew those customs and practices when 
they worked to his financial detriment.203
Justice Rutherford’s statement implies that the contract was binding on some level, 
and perhaps would have upheld the agreement but for its religious nature.
If so, it was not the content of the contract but the religious intention that the court 
refused to recognize. This could impact the religious minority’s identity by 
communicating that their religious identity is incompatible with Canadian legal 
institution. It is the specific practice or belief but the language of religion that is 
inconsistent with Canadian law. Furthermore, family law’s consistency with mainstream 
Christianity increases the likelihood that this requirement will unduly impact on religious 
minorities.
The Implications of Judicial Discourse in Mahr Disputes
The inconsistency of judicial treatment and outcome causes uncertainty in the law 
for religious minorities. Fournier argued that when the court refuses to enforce a contract
203 Kaddoura v. Hammoud, 1999 CarswellOnt 191 (Ont. Ct. J.), at para. 6.
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because it was made for a religious purpose, even though its terms would otherwise be
enforceable, it sends the message to minorities that “some people are allowed to
participate in the construction of Canadian identity; some are not.”204 This case law
review suggests that the Canadian court is not adequately achieving the goal of being
sensitive to religious difference.
The court was insensitive to religious minorities in Kaddoura, Nathoo, Amlani and
M. (N.M.) insofar as it dealt with the religious nature of the contracts in an all-or-nothing
way. When the court refused to enforce the agreement in Kaddoura, it did so by placing
so much emphasis on the religious aspect of the terms that the contract became
unrecognizable at law. Justice Rutherford made religion the determinative issue by
construing religion as outside the realm of the law. The judge felt he had no authority to
write about Islam because he was not Muslim.205 But having decided that he was not
qualified to determine the nature of the Islamic agreement, he goes on to compare the
mahr agreement to traditional Christian vows.
W hile not, perhaps, an ideal comparison, I cannot help but think that the obligation  
o f  the Mahr is as unsuitable for adjudication in the civil courts as is an obligation in a 
Christian religious marriage, such as to love, honour and cherish, or to remain 
faithful, or to maintain the marriage in sickness or other adversity so long as both 
parties live, or to raise children according to specified religious doctrine. M any such 
prom ises go w ell beyond the basic legal commitment to marriage required by our 
civil law, and are essentially matters o f  chosen religion and morality. They are 
derived from and are dependent upon doctrine and faith. They bind the conscience as 
a matter o f  religious principle but not necessarily as a matter o f  enforceable civil 
law.206
204 Fournier, 62.
205 Fournier, 63.
206 Kaddoura at para. 25.
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Natasha Bakht and Fournier argue that the comparison is inappropriate. The 
Christian vows to “love, honour and cherish” are vague and unenforceable, whereas the
707mahr is an obligation to pay a previously agreed-upon sum of money.
The court diminishes the dignity of individuals by limiting their ability to form 
contracts when it refuses to uphold agreements that would otherwise be enforceable 
simply because the agreement incorporates religious beliefs. This allowed the court to 
ignore the perspective of the parties or the implications of not upholding the agreement. It 
allowed the court to avoid a contextual approach. In her case law analysis, Fournier 
argued that the judgment in Kaddoura rendered the “particular experience and 
perspective of Muslim people invisible at the same time as it marks them as the
70S‘Other.’” Based on general principles of contract law, Kaddoura may have been 
decided differently had the parties entered into the same contract without mentioning 
religion.209
The court dealt with religion in an all-or-nothing way in the British Columbia cases 
where the mahr was upheld by either unduly ignoring the contracts’ religious aspects or 
by deferring to Islamic law as determinative. The court ignored religion in Amlani. The 
only mention of religion was the recognition that the mahr was made as part of the 
marriage ceremony in accordance with the Ismaili Muslim tradition.210 Otherwise, the 
court construed the document as secular in nature. It recognized that the mahr is a 
financial obligation and enforced the contract, but it did so by rendering the document’s 
religious aspects invisible. By ignoring religion, the court avoided making any
207 Fournier, 61; Bakht, “Family Arbitration using Sharia Law,” 13-14.
208 Fournier, 53.
m  Ibid., 63.
210 Amlani at para. 10.
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pronouncement about whether the contract could be religious and also enforceable. This 
could be resolved if the court would clarify whether it must treat the contractual duty as 
something to be enforced apart from religious obligation or whether the religious 
obligations underlying the contractual duty can be consistent with the law. While the 
court should refrain from making statements about religion if it is irrelevant, the mahr is 
part of a religious belief system and the ruling would be more accurate if this fact were 
addressed.
Ignoring the religious identity that the parties adopt in the contract can also have 
implications for the way their identity is constructed in court, “ ...to ignore the identity- 
related nature of these disputes [identity claims] or to recast identity-related claims so that 
they are no longer presented in terms of identity offers, at best, an indirect and often 
inadequate means of resolving such disputes.”211 Clearly the parties have ordered an 
important family relationship according to the dictates of their faith, and at least for some 
individuals, those religious beliefs form part of their identity.
In Kaddoura, the court accepted that the husband understood the terms of the 
agreement, was required to enter into it to be married religiously, but refused to enforce 
it.212 Similarly, in Nathoo and M. (N.M.), the court found that in order to marry in the 
Ismaili-Muslim tradition they had no choice but to enter into the mahr.213 Justice Joyce 
wrote, “Both parties wished to marry in the Ismaili faith and they understood and 
accepted that a condition of doing so was to agree to the Maher.”214 In British Columbia,
211 Eisenberg, “Identity and Liberal Politics,” 249.
212 Kaddoura at paras. 25-28.
213 Nathoo at para. 24; M. (N.M.) at para. 7.
214 Ibid., at para. 28.
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the fact that they had “no choice” but to enter into the contract in order to be married 
religiously is not enough to overturn it.
The different outcomes might reflect different perspectives on the importance of the 
right of exit. As noted in Chapter Two, Jeff Spinner-Halev argues that if certain minimum 
standards are present,215 individuals have the right to exit their culture or religion if they 
disagree with its rules, and so the state should permit individuals to make choices that 
appear to be illiberal. This was the approach taken in Nathoo and M. (N.M.). Justice 
Rutherford appeared to take the opposite approach in Kaddoura-, the fact that the 
individuals either had to sign the mahr or marry outside their religion was not seen to be a 
real choice.
The approach in Khan was sensitive because the court took a contextual approach 
to the case. Only after the technical elements of the document were examined to see if the 
contractual requirements had been fulfilled did the court consider the document’s 
religious aspects. While this approach was respectful because it recognized both the 
religious and the secular aspects of the agreement, the judge made statements that could 
have negative implications for the Muslim identity. He took the approach taken by Justice 
Rutherford in Kaddoura, finding that there was an inequality of bargaining power 
because the wife essentially had no choice but to enter into the nikah agreement in order 
to complete the religious marriage.217
The different approaches taken on this issue in these cases are interesting. In 
Nathoo and M. (N.M.), the court found that the parties truly consented to the agreement
215 The minimum standards he refers to include decent health care, nutrition, social interaction, basic 
literacy and a mainstream liberal society. The minimum standards ensure that a person has a real right to 
exit. Spinner-Halev, 160.
216 Spinner-Halev, 159-60.
217 Khan at para. 49.
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when they were married. They knew that the agreement was necessary to be married 
religiously and, by choosing to marry religiously, they had to agree to the mahr. In 
Kaddoura and Khan, the court found that because the mahr or nikah is an essential part 
of the Muslim marriage, the parties did not have a real choice but to enter into it. The 
Ontario and British Columbia courts came to opposite conclusions on the same issue. In 
Nathoo and M. (N.M.), the court focused on the fact that the mahr was essential to the 
religious ceremony. They accepted that the parties wanted to be religiously married, and 
that therefore they must also have accepted that they were required to enter into a civilly 
enforceable mahr agreement. The husbands testified that they did not believe that their 
agreements would be civilly enforced. Whether they truly believed this or whether they 
were arguing it in court in an attempt to circumvent their contractual responsibilities is a 
finding of fact for the court to decide. A judge could presumably still consider whether 
the parties understood they were making a binding contract within the secular rules 
governing contract interpretation.
The court was unwilling to uphold the nikah because it would have had 
unconscionable results. Removing the wife’s right to property would have been a 
particularly harsh result since she had recently immigrated and was being sponsored by 
her husband. Upholding the agreement would have left her alone in a new country with 
no financial resources whatsoever.
The use of the term “unconscionable,” however, has negative implications for the 
Muslim identity. Justice Clark quotes Black’s Law Dictionary’s definition of 
“unconscionable contract” as “one which no man in his senses, not under delusion, would
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make on the one hand, and which no fair and honest man would expect on the other.” 
The court noted that the wife had entered into marriage according to the dictates of her 
culture.219 The nikah was called a “standard marriage contract in Pakistan.”220 Linking 
the nikah to the cultural norms and then calling it “unconscionable” suggests that if a 
Muslim woman has entered into a nikah agreement, she must have either been forced to 
do so or she is not “in her senses.” This paternalistic view discounts the beliefs of Muslim 
women. While the issue of the wife’s consent, and whether it is “true” consent or whether 
she is being pressured by her family or community is a difficult issue, and one that is 
discussed in more detail in Chapter Four. One must accept the possibility that some 
women would choose to enter into this kind of contract. The term “unconscionable” 
diminishes her capacity to consent.
Khan would have been better decided by focusing on the specific circumstances of 
the parties. The judge makes no reference to whether the wife willingly submitted to the 
arranged marriage and nikah agreement. She might have validly submitted to the 
agreement and later opposed it on the grounds that it would result in unconscionable 
circumstances in light of the couples’ immigration.
The judge could have gotten around stripping the wife of her entitlement to support 
by refusing to uphold the contract because of her present circumstances. The situations of 
the parties had changed since the time of marriage. Justice Clark noted that the court will 
afford less weight to a marriage contract than to a separation agreement because the 
m arriage contract is entered  into at the time of marriage and might not reflect the 
situation, needs, or financial resources of the parties at the time the marriage breaks
218 Ibid., at para. 41.
219 Ibid., at para. 9.
220 Ibid., at para. 22.
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down. Separation agreements, on the other hand, are generally negotiated with a view to 
divorce and with knowledge of the financial resources and the particular situation of both 
parties.
A contextual approach to family law contracts that takes cultural or religious laws, 
traditions and obligations into account would show respect for these practices and help 
the court to better understand the position of the parties before it. Responding to religious 
beliefs with respect and understanding requires being sensitive to context. In order to be 
sensitive to context, judges must be educated about religious differences and their 
importance.
Pascale Fournier advocates increasing the court’s sensitivity to cultural and 
religious minority demands through the “functional approach.” When a mahr agreement 
is before the court, she suggests that the court first analyze the document to see if it 
contains the technical elements necessary for it to be a legal contract. If it does, the judge 
should proceed to address the role that the mahr plays in the Muslim marriage to 
determine its enforceability as a matter of public policy.222 This requires taking notice of 
the specific facts of the case, as well as the social, cultural and religious contexts within 
which those facts exist.223 She describes the functional approach as a way of focusing on 
the situation from the parties’ own perspective, rather than focusing on their cultural 
differences and how they are unfamiliar to the law.224 The functional approach recognizes
221 Ibid., at para. 61.
222 Fournier, 71.
223 Ibid., 70.
224 Ibid. ,71 .
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differences as relational rather than intrinsic.225 A minority’s difference is determined in 
relation to the majority, rather than understood as being inherently good or bad.
Fournier argues that this approach would improve the situation of women who are 
party to mahr agreements. It asks for the woman’s perception of her religious marital 
obligations rather than silencing her by ignoring her religious request and forcing her to 
look exclusively to religious authorities for recognition, or by accepting the contract as a 
given and deferring to the Islamic authority’s interpretation of what Muslim law 
requires.226 At the moment, Muslim women are prone to being silenced in family law 
disputes.
M uslim w om en becom e monum entalized objects, frozen and fixed eternally 
through the colonial gaze o f  judges without any account for their own  perspective 
o f  what it means to be M uslim, “oriental” and different. These fem ale litigants’ 
personhood disappears during the majoritarian legal decision-m aking process. In 
denying their claim s, judges display an impoverished understanding o f  what 
culture and religion are, how they differ and w hy they matter... Both Canadian and 
American judicial d iscourse...is  at once horrified and fascinated by M uslim  
w o m en .227
This comment refers to the situation in Kaddoura where the court denied the 
woman’s claim. This statement could also apply to the Khan decision, even though the 
woman’s claim was accepted in this case. The decision in Khan was written from the 
court’s own perspective, with little reference to the wife’s beliefs. The nikah agreement 
would result in a wife losing her right to spousal support, a result that is inconsistent with 
Canadian family law legislation and potentially at odds with the Charter values that 
protect gender equality. It is important not to discount the nikah solely because of a 
perception that it is not in line with “Canadian” values. The court should hear from the
225 Ibid., 52.
226 Ibid., 62.
227 Ibid., 56-57 and 94.
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woman who has given up her right to spousal support to understand the role that 
agreement played in the marriage and why she opposes the agreement.
Fournier’s approach allows the judge to consider the needs and circumstances of 
the parties and strike down contracts that result in unconscionable circumstances. 
Nothing prevents women from contracting out of their property rights where religion is 
not an issue. By calling the cultural practice “oppressive” it denies the possibility that 
Muslim women may want to live in the manner dictated by their culture or religion. 
Fournier’s approach protects the dignity of individuals rather than forcing people into 
comprehensive categories such as “woman” or “Muslim”.
Fournier’s approach is similar to Shachar’s “joint-govemance” model in that they 
both highlight the need for cooperation between the state and religious or cultural 
authorities in the area of family law. Shachar argued that cultural groups and the state 
should share jurisdiction over family law issues.228 Fournier envisioned leaving authority 
solely with the court. Despite the differences in their proposed solutions, both scholars 
recognized the ineffectiveness of subjecting religious minorities to the authority of a state 
institution which does not recognize the importance of the religious issues to the parties 
before it.
Fournier’s functional approach would make the court’s approach to religious 
issues more consistent. Laws that seem innocuous to the Canadian majority can have 
severe consequences for those who come from non-Christian religions. “The coercive 
power of the law resides precisely in its ability to appear neutral when in reality it shapes 
society in the mold of dominant values.”229
228 Shachar, “Religion, State and the Problem o f Gender.”
229 Fournier, 94.
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Adopting Fournier’s approach would give religious minorities, and the minorities 
within those minorities, a voice in the courtroom. If the court refuses to uphold contracts 
that refer to religion without offering other religiously-based options like faith-based 
arbitration, religious minorities are less able to participate in the legal system while 
simultaneously retaining their religious identities. Their beliefs are portrayed as foreign to 
Canadian values so that the judicial system is not able to recognize or uphold them. The 
court in Khan noted that allowing different religions or cultures to carry out their beliefs 
may result in circumstances that are “unacceptable” to Canadian society, effectively 
marking the “foreign” culture as “un-Canadian.”230 In refusing to make pronouncements 
about the validity of contracts based on religious belief, the court sends a strong message 
that the religious beliefs themselves are invalid or inconsistent with mainstream Canadian 
values. The court interprets family law contracts in accordance with majoritarian 
concepts, forcing the religious minority to conform in order to gain legal recognition.
A pluralist society’s legal system should consider ways to evaluate contracts that 
arise from religious beliefs. The court should not begin ruling on religious dogma, but it 
might be able to enforce religious clauses in contracts that otherwise comply with legal 
requirements if the contract does not require that the court determine substantive religious 
questions. The court can validly refrain from becoming “arbiters of religious dogma” and 
still rule on mahr agreements. None of the five cases examined in this chapter required 
the court to determine the substantive requirements of Islam.
If Canada aspires to multiculturalism that allows individuals to keep their ethnic 
identity while feeling a sense of belonging to the state, the legal system should be 
concerned with improving equality of treatment for Muslims in family law. It should be
230 Fournier, 53.
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concerned with the way Muslim identity is being construed in the courtroom. The court 
cannot avoid dealing with religion in family law cases, so it should adopt a consistent, 
sensitive, contextual approach to family law disputes where religion plays a central role. 
This requires giving effect to a contract that fulfills the requirements of secular contract 
law despite religious intentions, but not by merely ignoring the contract’s religious 
aspects.
The politics of recognition might argue that the court is not sufficiently engaging 
in a democratic dialogue with the religious minorities in these cases by ignoring a 
contract’s religious aspects or by demonstrating an insufficient understanding of religious 
beliefs through inappropriate comparisons to the majority. Ignoring religious beliefs 
when minorities have clearly relied on them to shape their legal obligations means 
ignoring a fundamental way in which religious people understand themselves and their 
place in society. It suggests that the state will ignore religion, and therefore the person 
who understands his or her identity as ‘religious’ cannot fully participate in Canadian 
society. In Khan, the court is more sensitive to context, but referring to the contract as 
“unconscionable” is problematic.
Egalitarian liberals might agree that religious minorities are disproportionately 
affected by statutory family law. They might support finding alternatives within the legal 
system for religious minorities, despite their belief that pluralist societies should treat 
everyone the same regardless of their cultural or religious background, because there is a 
history of discriminatory treatment and a structural problem that leads to this 
discrimination. Family laws are not “neutral” as to religion, but are generally consistent 
with Christian principles. The law’s inconsistency and insensitivity to religious minority
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differences may be enough to show that the court has been unable to deal effectively with 
religious differences in family law disputes.
Religious contracts in family law arrangements were examined in this chapter 
because contract law is the most likely way that religious minorities will attempt to have 
their beliefs recognized at law. But this option may not be viable, and if the court refuses 
to uphold religiously-based marriage contracts, religious minorities may have little legal 
recourse. The cases indicate that those seeking to enforce religious obligations through 
contracts face an uncertain state of law and may face judges who are not sensitive to their 
cultural or religious differences.
Fournier’s functional approach was considered in this chapter as a more sensitive 
way that the court could deal with religious contracts. The court must become more 
sensitive and consistent in their consideration of the mahr or similar religiously-based 
agreements. The functional approach may strike a desirable compromise because it 
requires that minorities appeal to the court, who would be equipped to take the religious 
differences of the parties into account. Faith-based arbitration is another option that may 
help the court deal with minority legal issues.
Neither of these approaches will be able to completely remove insensitivity from 
the law. But, as the result in Kaddoura demonstrates, insensitivity currently exists in the 
legal system and it can result in unfair treatment. Because problems exist in the current 
legal system, Ontario might attempt to minimize them by adopting other methods, like 
faith-based arbitration. Chapter Four evaluates whether the government should consider 
restoring faith-based arbitration to address the problems that religion can create in family 
law disputes.
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Chapter Four
The Potential for Faith-Based Arbitration in Canada’s Legal System
Chapter Three explained how the legal system treats minorities insensitively. 
Religious minorities may be reluctant to appeal to the legal system due to fears that the 
courts will not adequately address religious issues and concerns. In this way, the legal 
institution itself may be contributing to demands for faith-based arbitration. If so, this 
could impact negatively on multiculturalism in Canada, which attempts to encourage 
minorities to retain their identities while participating in state institutions. This chapter 
examines whether faith-based arbitration could help rectify this situation in a manner that 
is consistent with a cohesive multicultural society.
The Province of Ontario commissioned former Attorney General Marion Boyd to 
recommend on the viability of family law arbitration generally and religious arbitration in 
particular. Groups representing women’s rights, human rights and religious faiths231 
submitted concerns about the effects of faith-based arbitration.
These concerns centered around two themes. The first theme was that faith-based 
arbitration would harm women by subjecting them to patriarchal religious beliefs that 
women are inferior to men.232 They feared that faith-based arbitration would lend 
government support to discriminatory, patriarchal rules by using the courts to enforce the 
decisions they govern. The second theme was that faith-based arbitration would
231 For a complete list o f  the groups and individuals who made submissions to Marion Boyd, see Marion 
Boyd, Dispute Resolution in Family Law: Protecting Choice. Promoting Inclusion. Report prepared for the 
Attorney General and Minister Responsible for Women’s Issues, December 2004, 154-6.
232 Boyd, 31; Pamela Cross, An Analysis o f Marion Bovd’s ‘Dispute Resolution in Family Law: Protecting 
Choice. Promoting Inclusion.’ Report prepared for the Metropolitan Action Committee on Violence Against 
Women and Children, January 27,2005. [online]; accessed 24 May 2005; available from http://www.owjn. 
org/issues/mediation/boyd.htm, 11.
67
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
encourage minorities to withdraw from mainstream society, isolating themselves in their
•3
separate religious communities.
Boyd addressed such concerns in her report. She recommended that the province 
keep faith-based arbitration, but add safeguards to make the process more fair. These 
safeguards included mandatory independent legal advice (or that the right to such advice 
be explicitly waived) and mandatory screening for domestic abuse.234 She increased the
235demands placed on arbitrators by recommending that they give written decisions, that 
they belong to a professional voluntary association and register with the province in order 
to have their decisions enforced in court,236 and that they distribute a statement of 
principles that explains the parties’ rights and obligations and the processes under the
737particular form of religious law to their clients. She recommended that the province 
play a greater role by instituting public legal education aimed at informing women of 
their rights at Canadian law238 and funding information materials about parties’ rights and 
obligations under religious law for community centers that offer arbitration services.239 
She further recommended that the government consider establishing court oversight for 
settlements based on religious law.240
This chapter argues that faith-based arbitration could work successfully in Canada 
if Boyd’s recommendations were adopted. It would avoid isolating minorities by
233 This was the Muslim Canadian Congress’ submission. Boyd, 52. This position was also put forth by the 
Canadian Council o f Muslim Women. Natasha Bakht, “Arbitration, Religion and Family Law: Private 
Justice on the Backs o f Women. Report prepared for the National Association o f Women and the Law,
March 2005. [online]; accessed 24 May 2005; available from http://www.nawl.ca/ns/en/documents/ 
Pub_Rprt_ReligArb05_en.pdf, 56.
234 Boyd, 136.
235 Ibid , 134.
336 Ibid , 135-6.
237 Ibid. 136.
m  Ibid, 138.
239 Ibid., 141.
240 Ibid., 142.
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incorporating faith-based arbitration into the legal system. Ontario’s decision has not 
eradicated religious arbitration. It will continue, but outside the law where vulnerable 
parties do not have the protection of safeguards. Recognizing faith-based arbitration 
decisions would allow religious minorities to appeal to religious authorities and the state 
simultaneously, and allow the state to enact safeguards to protect vulnerable parties.
How Faith-Based Arbitration Can Protect Women
Women’s groups were especially concerned about the impacts of allowing 
families to resolve disputes based on patriarchal religious beliefs. The Canadian Council 
of Muslim Women argued that, while there are various interpretations of Shari’a law 
within Islam, some interpretations favour men over women.
For instance, the Islamic Institute of Civil Justice’s position on child custody is 
that the mother is entitled to custody of her son until he is seven years old, and of her 
daughter until puberty.241 The International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic 
Development (ICHRDD) argued that some interpretations of Islam allow men to leave 
their wives with little financial support or property upon divorce.242
Bakht noted that some Muslim countries have refused to sign the Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) in the name 
of Islam.243 There are different interpretations of Islam and Shari’a law, and not all 
schools of Islamic thought would support patriarchal beliefs. As there is no uniform
241 Syed Mumtaz Ali, “Custody and Guardianship in Islam,” The Canadian Society o f Muslims, [online]; 
accessed 09 August 2006; available from http://muslim-canada.org/guardian.htm.
242 Rights & Democracy, “Behind Closed Doors: How Faith-based Arbitration Shuts Out Women’s Rights 
in Canada and Abroad,” 2005 [online]; accessed 24 May 2005; available from http://www.dd-rd.ca/ 
rd.ca/english/commdoc/publications/women/arbifaith.htm, 5.
243 Bakht, Arbitration. Religion and Family Law: Private Justice on the Backs o f Women. 25.
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interpretation of Shari’a law, it is conceivable that some arbitrators would use a 
“regressive interpretation” that would adversely affect women.244
The harmful impacts of a regressive interpretation could be limited by adopting 
Boyd’s recommendations. She suggested that a viable faith-based arbitration regime 
would require that all parties receive independent legal advice before submitting to the 
procedure. This advice would inform them of their Canadian rights and explain how the 
outcome might differ under secular law than under religious law. The arbitration would 
take place by a trained arbitrator would was registered with the province. The arbitrator 
would screen the parties in an attempt to determine whether they are in an abusive 
relationship. The Act would be changed to prohibit contracting out of the right of appeal. 
These safeguards would help limit the harm that a regressive interpretation of Shari’a law, 
or other religious laws, would have on women.
Independent legal advice is critical to ensuring that the parties are making an 
informed decision to arbitrate. The parties must be informed of their rights at Canadian 
law and have the arbitration process explained to them. New immigrants to Canada are 
especially vulnerable to being unaware of their rights at Canadian law. Independent legal 
advice is important to help ensure that both parties are aware of their secular entitlements 
and their options for appeal and judicial review. It is difficult to justify the court 
upholding a decision that awards a woman less than what she would be entitled to at 
Canadian law unless her decision was informed. Boyd recommended that the Regulations 
to the Arbitration Act and Family Law Act require the arbitrator to request that the parties
244 Ibid., 21.
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present him or her with a certificate showing that they had received independent legal 
advice, or that they had formally waived this right.245
Boyd’s recommendation that the government develop a screening process for 
abuse is an important safeguard for women. Alternative dispute resolution is not 
recommended for couples in an abusive relationship. The power imbalance renders the 
abused party virtually incapable of protecting her own rights. An abused person is not in 
an equal bargaining position to the abuser, and is much more likely to give into the 
abuser’s demands.246 Although it would be difficult, in some situations, to ascertain 
whether the parties’ relationship is abusive, inquiries could be made before arbitration 
began. Boyd recommended that the government develop a standardized screening process 
for domestic abuse for family law arbitration. She was not specific about what that 
screening process would entail.247
Boyd’s recommendations envisioned increasing the accountability of arbitrators. 
Boyd recommended changes to the 1991 Act, which placed no limitations on who could 
be appointed to act as the arbitrator. She suggested that all arbitrators register with the 
province and belong to voluntary professional associations in order for their decisions to 
be enforced in court.248 The voluntary professional association would be responsible for 
training the arbitrators, but she did not specify the amount or type of training that they 
would receive.249
She also increased the responsibilities of arbitrators by recommending that they 
keep all arbitration records for a minimum of ten years, and requiring that they report to
245 Boyd, 136.
246 Boyd, 97; Bakht, Arbitration. Religion, and Family Law. 7.
247 Boyd, 139.
248 Ibid , 135-6.
249 Ibid , 139.
71
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
the Ministry of the Attorney General annually. The annual reports were designed to strike
a balance between privacy and transparency by requiring that arbitrators report on the
number of arbitrations conducted, the number of appeals pending, and any complaints or
disciplinary actions taken against them by the courts or their professional body. She
further recommended that the public be given access to summaries of their decisions, with
identifying information about the parties removed.250
Her recommendations would help safeguard women by ensuring that the arbitrator
is qualified and accountable, thus increasing the likelihood that the procedure would
adhere to state regulations.
The government should also make arbitrators available who could arbitrate
according to different religious interpretations. This would ensure parties can choose an
arbitrator who will apply the interpretation of the religious law in which they believe. Not
only should arbitrators be available to apply the law of different sects, they should be able
to apply both the moderate and fundamentalist interpretations within those sects.
While theoretically the parties decide which religious laws govern the arbitration,
the ICHRDD argued that faith-based arbitration would force the state to privilege some
religious interpretations over others.
Surely the government has no authority to determine which v iew s are truly 
authentic to a given faith, but that is exactly what it would be doing by enforcing 
religious rulings. It would effectively  privilege certain religious interpretations, at 
the expense o f  others, violating constitutionally protected freedom o f  religion.251
The authority to arbitrate, and the agreement about the procedure governing the
arbitration, derives from the parties to the arbitration. The court would not privilege
250 Ibid.
251 Rights & Democracy, “Behind Closed Doors: How Faith-based Arbitration Shuts Out Women’s Rights 
in Canada and Abroad,” 6.
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certain interpretations over others, but would uphold what the parties themselves had 
agreed to be bound. That being said, an individual might dispute the arbitrator’s 
interpretation of the religious rules. Presumably Boyd attempted to resolve this problem 
by introducing the requirement of a Statement of Principles of Faith-Based Arbitration. 
This Statement would explain the procedure and goal of faith-based arbitration. If the 
procedure and interpretation of religious rules were laid out prior to the arbitration, the 
court could refrain from ruling on substantive issues and simply rule on whether or not 
the parties abided by the agreed-upon procedure.
Enforcing religious rulings does not necessarily force the court to determine what 
is substantively required by any faith. The court refuses to make pronouncements about 
religious dogma, and requiring them to do so would have them overstep their jurisdiction. 
The court could vitiate a contract on procedural grounds without having to choose 
between different religious interpretations if the parties were required beforehand to 
identify which religious interpretation would govern the arbitration. Court rulings on 
procedure would ensure there was valid consent, ensure that each party was heard and 
given equal consideration by the arbitrator, that the parties were apprised of their secular 
rights, and that no other procedural irregularities had occurred.
Parties should not be allowed to contract out of the right of appeal. They should be 
told at the time of arbitration how to initiate an appeal to the court in the event that they 
want to challenge the decision. Shachar suggested that faith-based arbitration should 
include mandatory judicial review of all arbitration decisions.253 Marion Boyd was not 
prepared to accept this proposal. “State scrutiny of each privately ordered arrangement
252 Boyd, 136.
253 Ayelet Shachar, “Religion, State and the Problem o f Gender: New Modes o f Citizenship and 
Governance in Diverse Societies,” McGill Law Journal. 50 (2005): para. 39.
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implies that no one is capable of making decisions on their own behalf. This is a degree of 
paternalism which I would find intrusive and inappropriate.”254
While it is impractical to suggest that the court review every privately-ordered 
contract, it could be available to oversee arbitration proceedings if asked to do so, 
particularly if there was a procedural, rather than a religious, question.
The court would also have to decide whether custody arrangements were decided 
in the best interests of the children. The Children’s Law Reform Act ensures that custody 
arrangements are always subject to the “best interests of the child” test. The parens 
patriae jurisdiction of the court requires that they protect and uphold the interests of the 
child. While this may allay the fears that patriarchal religious rules could harm children, 
applying the “best interests of the child” test means that secular interests will probably 
trump religious law. It is not clear how much deference the court should give to religious 
authorities in arbitration over custody matters. The rights of the child, who is not a party 
of the proceeding, and the rights of the parents to decide how to raise their children, is a 
difficult issue that would have to be considered. This chapter does not attempt to answer 
this dilemma.
The safeguards Boyd suggested would increase the time and cost associated with 
faith-based arbitration, but they are needed to ensure that both parties understand their 
rights and entitlements at Canadian law and to ensure that the arbitration process is fair.
Fathers Are Capable Too (FACT) submitted concerns that independent legal 
advice makes faith-based arbitration overly legalistic.256 Although the time and cost 
benefits of arbitration would be diminished, the process would still retain several benefits.
254 Boyd, 76.
255 Children’s Law Reform Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C. 12.
256 Boyd, 38.
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The parties could still tailor the process to suit their needs and could keep the details of 
their family dispute private. The procedure would still be more flexible and informal than 
it would be in court. Arbitration would allow the parties to play an active role in the 
dispute resolution process and appeal to the law of their choice, making recalcitrant 
individuals more likely to accept the arbitrator’s final decision.257
Those religious groups that advocate in favour of faith-based arbitration are doing 
so to secure the right to resolve disputes according to religious laws in a legally binding 
way. If the most important thing is to be able to enforce disputes resolved according to 
religious laws, allowing faith-based arbitration with certain safeguards may be an 
acceptable compromise, even though it diminishes the cost and time benefits of 
arbitration. The safeguards help reconcile concerns that women will be treated unequally 
and concerns that they cannot “truly” consent to giving up the gender rights that the 
secular law protects.
The National Association of Women and the Law (NAWL) emphasized the 
danger that fundamentalist religious interpretations pose to women, and argued that 
allowing faith-based arbitration will lend support to fundamentalist views. Shachar 
noted that the issue is not clear cut. While she recognized that “well-meaning 
accommodation by the state may leave members of minority groups vulnerable to severe 
injustice within the group, and may, in effect, work to reinforce some of the most
CQ
hierarchical elements of a culture,” she also argued that state oversight of private 
arbitrations might actually help combat fundamentalism. She suggested that fears of
257Ibid , 66-67.
258 Jackie F. Steele, Report o f the ‘International Perspectives on Religious Arbitration in
Family Law’ Conference. Report prepared for National Association o f Women and the Law, May 2005. 
[online]; accessed 09 Aug. 2006; available from http://www.nawl.ca/lob-rfl.htm.
259 Ayelet Shachar, Multicultural Jurisdictions: Cultural Differences and Women’s Rights. (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2001), 3.
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assimilation can motivate cultural leaders to try to protect traditions by imposing strict 
behavioural rules on women.260 If the state allowed religious groups some autonomy over 
family law decisions, it could lessen the threat of assimilation and religious leaders might 
be more flexible with regard to women.
Women will be subject to family law decisions based on fundamental religious 
interpretations regardless of the government’s position on faith-based arbitration. The Act 
does not prohibit private, non-binding arbitration. It does not prohibit parties from 
seeking advice from religious authorities. It merely prohibits them from using the law to 
enforce these decisions.
Introducing faith-based arbitration with the safeguards discussed here cannot 
guarantee protection for all women, but it limits the harm that could be caused if the 
safeguards were not in place. It also could result in less harm than might occur from the 
government’s refusal to recognize faith-based arbitration decisions at all. Ontario’s 
decision did not stop faith-based arbitration; it will continue in the private sphere, without 
the benefit of government oversight or safeguards.
Faith-Based Arbitration. Gender Equality and Individual Autonomy
Opponents of faith-based arbitration worried that women would be unduly 
pressured to enter into arbitration agreements by socioeconomic concerns, abusive 
relationships, low self-esteem, low education rates, immigration considerations, and 
pressure from the religious community.261
260 Ayelet Shachar, “Should Church and State be Joined at the Altar? Women’s Rights and the Multicultural 
Dilemma,” in Citizenship in Diverse Societies, eds. Will Kymlicka and Wayne Norman, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2000), 202. 
m  Ibid., 51.
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Allowing women to form contracts to arbitrate according to religious laws 
preserves their identity and dignity as individuals. A woman who decides to arbitrate 
according to religious rules that discriminate based on gender might not view her decision 
as “harmful”; on the contrary, it may be more meaningful than if she were forced to 
adjudicate the matter in court and was awarded more property.
Faith-based arbitration preserves individual dignity by recognizing the right to 
bind oneself to religious rules, even if the majority finds those rules to be oppressive. The 
Canadian majority must realize that some women want to contract out of laws that are 
designed to protect them. The principle of individual autonomy would suggest that 
women who are properly informed of their property rights under Canadian family law 
could give up those rights. If the state used its monopoly on coercive power to legally 
enforce decisions that were based on rules that discriminate against women, however, it 
would violate the principle of gender equality. This problem is further complicated by 
questions of whether women in a closed community are truly able to consent to 
discriminatory rules.
Faith-based arbitration could strike a compromise between gender equality and 
individual autonomy by allowing women to order their family lives through legally 
binding arbitration, but enacting safeguards to help protect vulnerable parties in the 
arbitration process. The safeguards would help ensure that a woman can make an 
informed choice to submit to arbitration that is governed by a patriarchal interpretation of 
religious rules.
Libertarian political theory emphasizes the right of individuals to make choices 
about how to best live their own lives. John Stuart Mill argued,
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He cannot rightfully be compelled to do or forbear because it will be better for 
him, because it will make him happier, because, in the opinion of others, to do so 
would be wise, or even right.262
This sentiment was echoed by Boyd.
People are entitled to make choices that others may perceive not to be correct, as 
long as they are legally capable of making such choices and the choice is not 
prohibited by law... 63
Boyd noted that, “A tension between protection of the vulnerable and a degree of 
paternalism that involves controversial assumptions about vulnerability is inherent in this 
discussion.”264 This statement is particularly true when it comes to the debate around the 
concept of “consent.”
The quality of consent, or the decision to arbitrate is a true and free decision, has 
been of concern to women’s groups. 265 How the court should measure true consent is 
problematic. Although any arbitral award could be overturned if there was coercion, it 
generally refrains from doing so unless the coercion was violent, or there was a threat of
' j f . f :
physical violence. But there are also more subtle forms of coercion that can be exerted 
on women.
Submissions from the International Campaign Against Shari’a Court in Canada, 
the Women’s Legal Education and Action Fund and NAWL questioned the ability of 
Muslim women in particular to consent to arbitration due to socioeconomic and 
immigration concerns, and family or community pressure. It is problematic to frame 
the issue of consent in cultural terms. The debate has held Muslim women to a double 
standard. The argument presented is problematic. I f  one accepts that Muslim women
262 John Stuart Mill, On Liberty. (Reprint; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), 14.
263 Boyd, 76.
264 Ibid, 11.
265 Bakht, “Family Arbitration using Sharia Law.”
266 Boyd, 136.
267 Ibid., 49-52.
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cannot give “true” consent due to socioeconomic, family, or other social pressures, it 
follows that either the lives of Muslim women are such that they are under substantially 
more pressure than members of other cultural or religious groups, that they are somehow 
inherently less capable of making free decisions, or that no woman’s consent should be 
accepted. None of these, however, are valid conclusions.
Concerns motivated by economics, family, community, children, and religion 
often influence a woman’s decision to arbitrate family law disputes and are not confined 
to any specific religious, ethnic or cultural community. Pressure exists in all family law 
arbitrations, including those held pursuant to statutory laws.
If Muslim women are not allowed to contract out of their rights because they are 
prone to socioeconomic disadvantage, then poor women of all backgrounds should be 
subject to the same limitation. If Muslim women cannot consent to arbitration because of 
fears that they are doing so from pressure by their family or community, all women who 
are strongly influenced by their families or communities should be prohibited from 
consenting to arbitration.
The state did not remove arbitration as an option for all family law disputes, 
however, it only removed the option to arbitrate according to non-Canadian laws. Non­
religious women may face the same pressures that women’s groups worried would harm 
Muslim and other religious women. If it is impossible to judge the quality of a woman’s 
consent to arbitration, then one should question whether arbitration should be an option 
for any family law disputes.
The argument that it is impossible to judge the quality of a woman’s consent 
implies that women as a whole are somehow in need of protection and inherently less
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able to consent. This type of argument undermines the ability of women to fully exercise 
their rights as citizens and undermines the principle of individual autonomy.
This is not to say that all consent should be taken at face value. Pressures to 
arbitrate have been documented. Muslim and Jewish religious authorities have admitted 
to pressuring their members. When he established the Islamic Institute of Civil Justice, 
Syed Mumtaz Ali stated that once arbitration was available, Muslims had to use that 
forum in order to be considered “good” Muslims.268 Rabbi Reuven Tradburks admitted to 
pressuring Jewish people in Toronto to use arbitration.269 It is more accurate to say that 
some women (Muslim and otherwise) will be unduly pressured to consent to arbitration, 
while others will give true, free, informed consent.
If the government were to allow faith-based arbitration, then, it should focus on 
establishing a procedure that is free, as much as possible, from coercion, duress and fraud. 
The safeguards recommended by Marion Boyd would help achieve this goal. To ban 
faith-based arbitration because of concerns about a Muslim woman’s ability to truly 
consent reinforces the view that Muslim women are somehow backwards, particularly 
vulnerable, and less capable of granting consent. As long as the woman is informed of the 
consequences and has a right to appeal to the secular courts instead of engaging in faith- 
based arbitration, she should be permitted to contract out of the secular rights that attempt 
to equalize property division.
The debate between autonomy, cultural rights and gender equality is not easily 
resolved. It appears to require choosing one fundamental right over another. 270 If 
safeguards are put in place to ensure that the woman has been educated about her rights,
268 Boyd, 3.
269 Ibid., 56.
270 Eisenberg, “Identity and Liberal Politics,” 252-3.
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has received independent legal advice and has asserted that her decision to arbitrate is 
voluntary, her consent should be deemed to be sufficient. If consent is not sufficient in 
these circumstances, it is arguably never sufficient.
Jeff Spinner-Halev reminds us that liberal democracies must recognize that some 
individuals choose to belong to illiberal communities.271 The perspective of individual 
autonomy shifts the focus from whether the government can accommodate the illiberal 
practices of different cultures to whether individuals should have the right to submit to 
illiberal practices. In permitting faith-based arbitration, the state does not hand 
jurisdiction to religious authorities to govern their members, but rather gives individuals 
the ability to contract into resolving their dispute according to religious laws. In this view, 
individuals who are fully informed and whose decisions do not cause actual harm to other 
people should be permitted to arbitrate according to the laws of their faith. Enacting faith- 
based arbitration with safeguards might be a viable, practical compromise between 
autonomy and gender equality.
The government stated it was concerned about women’s rights and assured the 
public that any decision made about faith-based arbitration would take women’s concerns
77  7into consideration. When their decision was announced, however, the government was 
silent about the fact that banning faith-based arbitration could also have harmful 
implications for women.
The absence of faith-based arbitration, or a similar mechanism, may harm women 
by forcing them to decide their disputes solely within their religious community, where
271 Spinner-Halev, 157.
272 Ministry o f the Attorney General, “Statement by Attorney General on the Arbitration Act, 1991,” Sept.
8, 2005, [online]; accessed 15 November 2005, available from http://ogov.newswire.ca/ontario/GPOE/ 
2005/09/08/c7547.html?lmatch=&lang=_e.html.
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there are no legal safeguards. It forces women to make a choice: they can decide the 
dispute according to their religious values exclusively within their community, or they 
can set their dedication to their religious laws aside and use the secular system. Forcing 
them to make this choice can lead to women isolating themselves within their religious 
communities.
How Faith-Based Arbitration Can Prevent Isolation
The ICHRDD argued faith-based arbitration is inconsistent with multiculturalism
77“}because it appears to divide people into separate cultural or religious groups. The 
Canadian Muslim Congress echoed these fears of “ghettoization.”274 The fear is that faith- 
based arbitration will encourage individuals to interact mainly within their own 
community, preventing their integration into mainstream Canadian society, and creating 
divisions that will foster intolerance.275
Ontario’s decision to ban faith-based arbitration only refuses to give arbitral 
awards the force of law. It does not prohibit arbitration from occurring behind closed 
doors. Religious arbitration will continue to take place in mosques, synagogues, churches 
and private residences, away from state oversight and without safeguards. This is the 
greatest threat, as it leaves vulnerable people with little protection.
Faith-based arbitration might encourage participation within the state by providing 
religious minorities with the option to apply religious rules within the legal system. As 
noted in Chapter Three, the court has been unclear about whether it will uphold family 
contracts that refer to religious obligations. Without faith-based arbitration, individuals
273 Rights & Democracy, “Behind Closed Doors: How Faith-based Arbitration Shuts Out Women’s Rights 
in Canada and Abroad,” 5; Boyd, 51.
274 Boyd, 52.
275 Ibid., 47.
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may be completely incapable to have religious beliefs or obligations legally enforced. 
Although McGuinty implied that faith-based arbitration might threaten cohesion, the 
current state of the law could also create a divided community. The inability to resolve 
family issues with reference to religious laws could discourage religious individuals from 
using the state system. It could encourage them to appeal to their religious authorities 
instead. Anne Saris noted that in Britain, ethnic minorities have responded to the court’s 
lack of consideration of their cultural differences by operating outside the law.
Another apparent threat to cohesion is the concern that faith-based arbitration 
violates the rule of law. The Muslim Canadian Congress submitted that faith-based 
arbitration violates the rule of law by dividing people into separate religious groups and 
allows different laws to apply to different people based on their religious beliefs.277
Faith-based arbitration may be consistent with the rule of law. As outlined in 
Chapter Two, the definitions of the rule of law do not require subjecting every person to 
identical laws in every instance. It requires that laws be transparent, publicly available, 
applicable to state officials, and justiciable by a state legal system. Allowing parties to 
contract out of secular law in family disputes does not necessarily violate the “rule of 
law.” Faith-based arbitration does not establish multiple legal systems that operate 
parallel to the state. Arbitration remains subject to judicial oversight, making it a method 
of alternative dispute resolution based on contract that is subordinate to the state legal
0 1 Q
system. The state would not force people to abide by specific laws or use different legal 
systems based on their religious, cultural or ethnic background. Instead, it would give
216 Ibid., 81.
277 Ibid., 30.
278 Peter W. Hogg and Cara F. Zwibel, “The Rule o f Law in the Supreme Court o f Canada,” University of 
Toronto Law Journal 55. no. 3 (2005): 716.
279 Boyd, 88.
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individuals the option to legally bind themselves to specific religious rules. Instead of 
violating the rule of law, the state would be recognizing legal pluralism by giving 
individuals this choice.
•  •  280  •Legal pluralism asserts that several legal systems coexist in society. From this 
perspective, other legal systems are not necessarily subordinate to state law, except in the
^ 0 1  # .
sense that the state has a monopoly on power to enforce its laws. Canadian law exists 
alongside religious and cultural legal systems, and each set of laws might have different
'JO'}
rules for dealing with the same social issue. An individual who believes that their 
religious laws are the only legitimate laws is likely to give them primacy over state law, 
even if the two conflict.
Griffith’s distinction between “juristic legal pluralism” and the “social scientific 
view of legal pluralism” is a helpful framework to consider how legal pluralism applies to 
faith-based arbitration. As discussed in Chapter Two, juristic legal pluralism occurs when 
different laws are applied to individuals based on their ethnic or religious identity. The 
social scientific view of legal pluralism views the state law as simply one of many types 
of laws that exist within society.283 The two differ, then, to the extent that the state 
institutionalizes legal pluralism.
Instituting faith-based arbitration is like the juristic model of legal pluralism 
because the state gives cultural rules the force of law, but the faith-based arbitration 
system would avoid many of the complicated issues traditionally associated with juristic 
legal pluralism. Questions about when a subgroup’s law applies, about deciding what
280 Sally Engle Merry, “Legal Pluralism,” Law & Society Review 22, no. 5 (1988): 870.
281 Brian Z. Tamanaha, “The Folly o f the ‘Social Scientific’ Concept o f Legal Pluralism,” Journal o f Law 
and Society 20, no. 2 (Summer, 1993): 193.
282 Boaventura de Sousa Santos, “Law: A Map o f Misreading. Toward a Postmodern Conception o f Law,” 
Journal o f Law and Society 14, No. 3 (Autumn, 1987): 280.
283 Merry, 871.
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group individuals belong to, choice of law rules, and which subjects the subgroup’s law 
should be allowed to govern284 are avoided because an agreement to arbitrate is 
essentially a voluntary contract. Rather than the state slotting individuals into different 
groups and deciding which laws apply to them based on group membership, the 
individual identifies with a specific group, specifies which religious law he or she wants 
to govern the proceedings, and gives the arbitrator the authority to act accordingly. The 
parties opt into the system, rather than having it forced on them by the state. No one 
would be forced to use faith-based arbitration.
McGuinty rejected legal pluralism by banning faith-based arbitration. When he 
said that Ontarians must be subject to a single law, he was probably referring to laws 
enacted by the government rather than suggesting that the government only has one set of 
laws that apply equally to everyone. His statement that faith-based arbitration is 
“inconsistent with one law for all Ontarians” disregards the fact that the state can apply 
multiple laws to family disputes. Immigration and international law has allowed Ontario 
courts to recognize and apply the family laws of other countries. Different Acts deal with 
the same issues. For example, the Divorce Act2*5 and the Children’s Law Reform Act286 
both deal with child custody and may have different results depending on which one is 
used in the custody application. Family law also differs between provinces. McGuinty did 
not mean that we are all subject to the same law; he meant that we are all subject to 
Canadian law. The government appeared to be more concerned about allowing laws that 
stem from cultural or religious authorities than about having more than one law apply 
within the province. This might stem from a more restrictive view of the extent to which
2Mlbid.
285 Divorce Act, [R.S. 1985, c. 3 (2nd Supp.)].
286 Children’s Law Reform Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C. 12.
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a state can accept religious discourse and reasoning in the public sphere, or from concerns 
that patriarchal religious laws will violate principles of gender equality.
The government’s position that faith-based arbitration is “inconsistent with the 
principle of one law for all Ontarians” is debatable. Allowing faith-based arbitration gives 
minorities an option to abide by religious and state laws at the same time. By encouraging 
them to appeal to the state to resolve family law disputes, the state has an opportunity to 
institute safeguards and oversight while at the same time sending the message to 
minorities that their religious beliefs are valued and can be consistent with Canada’s 
institutions.
Conclusion
The political debate over faith-based arbitration focused on its potential to harm 
women and its potential to segregate groups based on cultural differences. This chapter 
argued that faith-based arbitration can be enacted in a way that minimizes these effects.
Rather than isolating minorities, faith-based arbitration invites them to use state 
institutions to resolve their disputes. It does not violate the rule of law by creating 
separate legal systems based on culture or religion. It is a dispute resolution mechanism 
that is subordinate to state law and is equally available to everyone within the state. It 
provides a way for religious people to resolve their family disputes according to religious 
laws through a procedure that is governed by the state. It potentially avoids the justice 
system’s insensitivity by giving minorities recourse to a legal mechanism that 
understands the importance of religious beliefs.
Recognizing the right of religious people to resolve their family law conflicts in 
accordance with the tenets of their faith legitimizes their religious laws and sends the
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message that the state recognizes the value of their beliefs. This benefits a multicultural 
state by encouraging minorities to use its institutions, thus becoming participating 
members of society. It allows individuals to follow the law that holds the most authority 
for them in a way that remains subject to state jurisdiction. The individual can be assured 
that the decision is both legal and in line with their religious faith because the final 
decision has been approved by both a religious authority and the state. They would no 
longer be forced to choose one law over the other.
Faith-based arbitration could potentially harm women if safeguards are not 
enacted to ensure they have independent legal advice, are informed of their statutory 
rights, and are able to contract out of judicial review. Any attempt to institute faith-based 
arbitration must limit this harm. Adopting the safeguards discussed in this chapter would 
afford protection to women far beyond what existed in the Act before the recent 
amendments. Canada has an interest in fostering the autonomy of all individuals, 
including religious women who want to make decisions about how to resolve family 
disputes. The state should respect a woman’s decision to submit to arbitration as long as 
that decision is informed and given voluntarily.
Marion Boyd recognized the importance of individual autonomy when she wrote, 
“Commitment to individual rights lies at the core of the legal and political organization of 
any liberal democracy...tolerance and accommodation must be balanced against a firm 
commitment to individual agency and autonomy.”287 We can only accommodate religious 
rules through faith-based arbitration if they respect individual rights. Individual rights can 
be protected through the safeguards discussed in this chapter, and individual autonomy is 
enhanced by respecting the individual’s choice to bind him or herself to religious rules.
287 Boyd, 92.
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Accepting faith-based arbitration means that the courts will have to enforce 
decisions that treat women differently on the basis of gender. The authority for these 
decisions does not arise from the state but from the individuals. The individual is the one 
who is consenting to submit to laws that treat women differently than men. The state is 
not necessarily encouraging illiberal practices, but encouraging individual autonomy. 
This is consistent with the liberal belief that individuals should not be prevented from 
making decisions simply because the majority does not agree with those decisions.
On the other hand, Canada is a liberal democracy with a commitment to gender 
equality. Enforcing an arbitral decision that has divided based on a belief that the husband 
has a greater entitlement because of his gender may undermine this commitment. 
Arguably, the state should not give political legitimacy to religious laws that violate the 
principle of gender equality.
If safeguards were introduced to the faith-based arbitration process, the state 
would be ensuring the procedural integrity of the arbitration and helping to ensure that 
women were making an informed decision to contract out of her secular rights. If a 
woman is making an educated choice as an autonomous, capable individual, she is 
entitled to that right. Safeguards that protect vulnerable parties while allowing them to 
form contracts might be a good compromise between gender equality and autonomy.
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Chapter Five 
Conclusions
This thesis evaluates Ontario’s decision to ban faith-based arbitration. Dalton 
McGuinty justified this decision to the press on the grounds that faith-based arbitration 
violates Ontario’s common legal ground and that it cannot be part of a cohesive 
multicultural society.
This thesis demonstrates that both of these claims are contestable. Canada is 
committed to multiculturalism, which is described as allowing all citizens to keep their 
cultural identity while participating in the state’s institutions. This implies that, ideally, 
individuals can feel a sense of belonging to their cultural group and a sense of being 
Canadian at the same time. But while the goals of multiculturalism are relatively clear, 
there is no consensus on how it is best achieved.
The theories of pluralism differ as to how an ethnically diverse society is best 
governed. Egalitarian liberalism generally suggests treating individuals the same under 
the law, despite their differences. Even if individuals have equal opportunities with the 
state, the choices they make means that unequal outcomes will result. This is not unfair, 
however; justice is achieved as long as individuals have equal access to and are treated 
equally under the law. The politics of recognition argues that treating people equally can 
have unequal results. Minorities whose cultural or religious practices differ from the 
Canadian tradition might be affected by laws more harshly than the majority. They may 
request different treatment, and society should decide whether the request is reasonable 
through a democratic dialogue that is informed by the norms, values and standards of the 
minority’s culture.
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Whether Ontario made the right decision to ban faith based arbitration in the name 
of multiculturalism depends on how it believes a multicultural society should best be 
governed. Should the law be flexible and allow, in some circumstances, cultures to be 
held to different rules of their choice, or should all cultures be treated the same, in spite of 
their differences? McGuinty’s comment that faith-based arbitration violates Ontario’s 
legal common ground promotes the view that all cultures must be treated identically 
under the law.
There is no consensus that faith-based arbitration violates the rule of law. The 
definitions of the rule of law identified in Chapter Two show that it can be defined 
broadly, so that it does not necessarily mean that every citizen must abide by the same 
laws. Instead of violating the rule of law, allowing faith-based arbitration might be a way 
of giving state recognition to the reality of legal pluralism. Legal pluralism suggests that 
there are several different sources of law at work in society, of which the state is only 
one. Some individuals feel that their religious laws hold more authority than the state 
laws.
Faith-based arbitration may not violate the rule of law because it is not a juristic 
model of legal pluralism. The state would not apply different laws to different people 
depending on their cultural or religious affiliation. It could never force individuals to 
submit to faith-based arbitration, or abide by non-governmental laws. The authority for 
the arbitration, and the authority to be bound to an alternative set of laws, stems from the 
individual rather than from the state. Faith-based arbitration is not a parallel legal system; 
it would remain subordinate to the state, subject to its oversight and judicial review. It 
might encourage minorities to appeal to the state rather than feeling forced to appeal just 
to their religious authorities.
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The reasons McGuinty gave to the press to justify Ontario’s decision, therefore, 
can be refuted. It depends on the type of society Ontario wants to be. If Ontario seeks to 
include all members in its institutions, to allow individuals to participate in the state and 
feel a sense of belonging while at the same time keeping their identity, the decision to ban 
faith-based arbitration is not obviously the best choice. The government began by 
engaging in a democratic dialogue when it commissioned former NDP Attorney General 
Marion Boyd to consult with groups who were in favour and against faith-based 
arbitration and make recommendations. But they then ignored her recommendations and 
banned it. Ontario should re-consider adopting faith-based arbitration, or at the very least 
re-consider the reasons why it was banned.
Adopting faith-based arbitration could be beneficial as it would make the legal 
system more responsive to religious difference. Chapter Three shows that the court has 
difficulty dealing consistently and sensitively with religious obligations in family law 
contracts.
Contract law generally allows individuals to order their affairs as they wish, but 
when religious obligations form the basis of the contract, it might be void for public 
policy reasons. Cases dealing with Islamic marriage contracts, or mahr agreements, have 
differed between provinces. In Ontario, Kaddoura v. Hammoud ruled that the contract 
was unenforceable because it referred to mahr. The British Columbia court upheld the 
mahr in Nathoo v. Nathoo, Amlani v. Hiram, and M. (N.M.) v. M. (N.S.). The different 
outcomes are surprising since the provincial family law legislation is similar and there 
was nothing in the cases to suggest that different circumstances warranted this differential 
treatment.
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In addition to the inconsistent results, insensitive judicial discourse within the 
cases reveals the difficulty that lies in interpreting religious contracts. In Kaddoura, the 
judge inappropriately compared specific, monetary Muslim contract to vague Christian 
marriage vows of “fidelity” and “love.” He suggested that, just as these Christian vows 
cannot be enforced legally, neither could the mahr agreement. This is an inappropriate 
comparison, since the courts could not enforce a vague vow like “love” but could enforce 
a contract to pay a specific, previously agreed-upon sum of money. He refused to enforce 
the mahr because it is a religious obligation.
Although the mahr agreements were upheld in British Columbia, the decisions 
had a tendency to ignore the religious aspect of the contracts. When construing whether 
they were enforceable, the court looked mainly to its secular construction than noting the 
religious obligation. In Amlani v. Hirani religion was barely mentioned at all. Failing to 
address how religious aspects of the contract fit in suggests that in order to recognize the 
legality of the contract, the court had to disregard the religious obligations on which the 
contract was based. It ignores the context of the contract.
The British Columbia court was willing to find that because the parties wanted to 
be married religiously, and because they knew that the mahr was an element of the 
religious marriage, they agreed to it and this agreement was enforceable. The opposite the 
approach was taken by the court in Kaddoura. The different conclusions might be 
attributed to different beliefs on the importance of exit rights. The British Columbia court 
notes that the parties had a right of exit; they could have chosen not to marry religiously 
had they not wanted to abide by the mahr. In Kaddoura, the court noted that the parties 
had no choice but to enter into the mahr if they wanted to be married religiously, and
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questioned the quality of consent given this situation. The court should clarify its position 
on this matter.
The current state of the law in Ontario suggests that couples cannot make a 
binding contract dividing marital property according to religious beliefs. It is not the 
content of the contract that is in dispute, but the religious intention underlying it. The 
cases suggest that religious minorities, in their capacity as religious individuals, have 
difficulty creating binding contracts. The court may either have to overlook the religious 
context of the contract, or the minority may have to disguise the religious beliefs in 
secular language that the courts can understand.
Because religious minorities may not be able to enforce a marriage contract that 
refers to religious beliefs, and because secular laws can be inconsistent with the values of 
some religions, faith-based arbitration might improve the justice system by allowing 
minorities to resolve family disputes in a legally binding manner according to religious 
beliefs. It would make the legal system more responsive.
One might question whether introducing faith-based arbitration would make the 
legal system more “fair” as well as increasing its sensitivity to religious difference. 
Would faith-based arbitration somehow make the legal system more objectively 
equitable? The answer to this question seems to depend on what one believes the role of 
the state should be.
Whether or not faith-based arbitration would make the legal system more “fair” is 
debatable. “Fairness” is difficult to qualify, because what is thought to be “fair” can 
depend on what one expects from the state. If one subscribes to the belief that “fairness” 
requires the state to only enforce one set of laws that applies identically to everyone, then 
faith-based arbitration is unfair. If one subscribes to the belief that “fairness” involves
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allowing individuals to live according to the rules that hold the most personal meaning, 
and bind themselves to those rules through contract law, then faith-based arbitration 
makes the legal system more fair.
Because egalitarian liberalism emphasizes the equal application of laws, it is the 
less likely than the politics of recognition to accept faith-based arbitration. Faith-based 
arbitration would have some members of society resolve their problems according to 
religious rules, while the rest would appeal to secular legislation.
The politics of recognition is more likely to accept that religious minorities should 
have a degree of autonomy in family law affairs. The central tenet of the politics of 
recognition is that every culture deserves equal respect. It suggests that requests to abide 
by different cultural practices should be evaluated through a democratic dialogue, 
whereby society identifies its own values, examines their importance, why they are held, 
and how they conflict with the minority’s request. The final decision about whether a 
cultural practice should be accepted or rejected should be informed by the minorities’ 
norms, values and traditions. It should be examined from the minorities’ perspectives.
If we accept that religion forms part of one’s identity, respect for that identity 
seems to suggest that the government should give greater consideration to the ability to 
legally bind oneself to these deeply held beliefs. To deny individuals this right seems to 
suggest that there is something about their very identity which is incompatible with 
Canadian values, such that it cannot be recognized at law. This affects their identity as 
Canadians, as they may feel they have to choose between their Canadian and their 
religious identity. This, in turn, can have implications for participation in the state’s 
institutions.
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Allowing individuals to arbitrate recognizes the right to order one’s affairs as they 
see fit. It preserves the principle of individual autonomy. On the other hand, faith-based 
arbitration would require the state to enforce laws that may violate the principle of gender 
equality. Likely one of the unstated reasons that the government banned faith-based 
arbitration was because it would give political support to laws that violate the principle of 
gender equality.
Faith-based arbitration could put the state in a position where, at least sometimes, 
it would have to enforce decisions that were made according to rules that favour men over 
women. The state may understandably be reluctant to give political legitimacy to illiberal 
rules. Should personal autonomy or gender equality prevail in this debate?
The answer to this question must lie in what we expect the state to protect, and 
how protection is best achieved. Individual autonomy is one of the most important 
elements of a liberal democracy. Women cannot have autonomy without gender equality, 
because otherwise they could be subject to different laws than men, or be left without the 
same rights or same opportunity to exercise those rights. Without gender equality, she 
might not be able to participate in the state to the fullest extent possible. But do women 
truly have autonomy if they are not also allowed to reject secular laws meant to protect 
their equality? Should women be forced to be equal? Some people choose to belong to 
illiberal groups. Forcing a woman to abide by equality rights, then, also violates the 
principle of individual autonomy.
One might argue that women are not being forced to be equal. The state is not 
forcing women to use the secular legislation, but only refusing to enforce laws that are not 
part of the state. They are allowed to behave any way they want, within the constraints of 
the law, but the court will not enforce decisions that discriminate against them. But this
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does interfere with their autonomy because they do not have the right to contract out of 
laws that protect their rights to property. Contract law is designed to allow parties to 
arrange their private lives as they see fit. One might argue that the contracts that violate 
gender equality could be void because they are contrary to public policy. But if 
safeguards are in place to help ensure, as much as possible, that the woman’s decision to 
arbitrate according to illiberal rules is informed and her consent is voluntary, this suggests 
it is against public policy to allow a woman to make this choice. It arguably violates a 
woman’s right to choose for herself the way she would like to order her family affairs. 
The state is not recognizing her autonomy to make this choice.
Faith-based arbitration, with the proper safeguards, allows the state to balance 
personal autonomy with gender equality. Marion Boyd’s recommendations would have 
had the government keep faith-based arbitration and enact safeguards to better protect 
women. The focus on the potential for faith-based arbitration to harm women allowed 
policy makers to give less consideration to the impact on women who believe it is more 
important to abide by their religious rules rather than secular laws. Concerns that faith- 
based arbitration could harm vulnerable parties, such as women, should be taken 
seriously, and if the government were to re-introduce faith-based arbitration, it must enact 
safeguards to minimize any potentially harmful effects of the process. Having reviewed 
the report and the concerns of women’s groups, Chapter Four agrees with Boyd’s 
recommendations. They would protect women without forcing them to either choose 
secular equality or appeal solely to religious authorities.
Faith-based arbitration could be an effective tool to help give recognition to 
religious minorities in the law and encourage their participation in the legal system in a
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way that does not interfere with Ontario’s cohesive, multicultural society. The 
government should reconsider its decision to ban faith-based arbitration.
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